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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, American employers expanded racially preferen-
tial "affirmative action"' policies geared toward hiring, retaining,
and promoting racial minorities for positions that they might
otherwise not gain in a more color-blind society.2 The less sweeping
affirmative action policies of an earlier era were based on remedial
justifications.' But as past acts of invidious discrimination collec-
tively became a more distant memory,4 employers began justifying
the expansion of affirmative action in terms of a very different
rationale: diversity.5 Colleges and universities used a similar
rationale for affirmative action for decades before employers
embraced the diversity rationale. A series of court battles has
defined the permissible bounds for the use of such policies in the
university context.6 But judicial guidance on the new type of
diversity-based affirmative action in employment has been almost
nonexistent.
This new type of diversity-based affirmative action in employ-
ment initially seems suspect as a matter of law. The Equal
Protection Clause renders all racial discrimination in the public
1. The term "affirmative action" as used throughout this Note refers to policies that
advantage racial minorities who are in direct competition with nonminorities for educational
and employment positions. The term does not refer to the less controversial practice of race-
sensitive outreach efforts to encourage minorities to apply for positions without preferential
treatment at the "point of competition." See Transcript of Oral Argument at 12, Grutter v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241).
2. See PETER W. WOOD, DIVERSITY: THE INVENTION OF A CONCEPT 204 (2003).
3. See id. at 209-10; infra Parts I.C, II.A.
4. See Paul Burstein & Mark Evan Edwards, The Impact of Employment Discrimination
Litigation on Racial Disparity in Earnings: Evidence and Unresolved Issues, 28 LAW & SOC'Y
REV. 79, 107-08 (1994) (concluding that the modern legal antidiscrimination regime has
drastically curtailed discrimination toward racial minorities); John R. Suton & Frank
Dobbin, The Two Faces of Governance: Responses to Legal Uncertainty in U.S. Firms, 1955
to 1985, 61 AM. Soc. REV. 794, 800-01 (1996) (discussing employers' increased use of
formalized personnel procedures and other compliance mechanisms to ensure
nondiscrimination against racial minorities). For a critical review of modern social science
literature that asserts the existence of continuing pervasive discrimination against racial
minorities, see RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAWS 55-58 (1992).
5. See WOOD, supra note 2, at 204.
6. See infra Parts I.B, III.A.
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sector presumptively invalid, including discrimination in favor of
minorities.' Similarly, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
protects individuals of all races from racial discrimination in the
private sector, apparently subject only to narrow remedial excep-
tions.' Yet, in the absence of judicial guidance, affirmative action
programs aimed toward achieving diversity in employment have
endured and expanded.
Recent judicial guidance on affirmative action in a nonemploy-
ment setting, however, may have profound consequences for the
legal status of affirmative action in employment. Grutter v.
Bollinger, the landmark 2003 Supreme Court case on affirmative
action in higher education, altered the equal protection frame-
work for assessing the legality of affirmative action.9 Though
seemingly confined to the educational mission of universities, the
Court's reasoning in Grutter did not center on the claimed First
Amendment value of ensuring a diversity of perspectives in the
student body, as it had in Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke.1" Instead, the Court in Grutter recognized an expanded
version of the diversity rationale that suggested that nonremedial
affirmative action to achieve diversity may also be valid in the
employment context." Grutter suggested that a series of generic
7. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No state shall ... deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S.
200, 227 (1995) (holding that the same principle of presumptive invalidity applies to all
government racial classifications that burden any individual, including programs that benefit
minorities and burden nonminorities).
8. See Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000), which states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin ....
Id.; see also United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 201-04, 208 (1979)
(recognizing a remedial exception to Title VII); McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427
U.S. 273, 280 (1976) (holding that Title VII bars racial discrimination against whites on the
same terms as discrimination against blacks).
9. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327-33 (2003) (approving affirmative action
program that a law school implemented to achieve "the educational benefits of a diverse
student body").
10. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311-14 (1978) (opinion of
Powell, J.).
11. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 327-33.
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postgraduate educational benefits of diversity were themselves
sufficient to justify affirmative action apart from any uniquely
educational benefits.' 2 The Court in Grutter, however, did not ex-
pressly address the applicability of that rationale to employment. 3
Furthermore, lower courts have not yet squarely addressed the
general applicability of Grutter to employment. A momentous
unanswered question thus remains: does either equal protection or
Title VII restrict the modern tendency of employers to use affirma-
tive action to achieve workforce diversity?
As the Supreme Court has defined the validity of affirmative
action, the academic literature generally has not addressed this
momentous question. Though affirmative action generally has been
a popular subject of academic debate, many authors have advanced
broad arguments for remedial affirmative action in all areas of
society rather than in employment specifically. 4 In view of the
Supreme Court's preference for narrowly framed reasoning on
affirmative action,' 5 this scholarly omission is noteworthy. Many
authors have addressed the diversity rationale, but this scholarship
tends to focus only on the educational context.' A small number of
articles have focused on the diversity rationale for affirmative
action in employment. 17 Like the academic literature on affirmative
action generally,'" these authors' analyses tend to be uniformly
12. Id. at 330-33.
13. See id.
14. See, e.g., Michael Selmi, Remedying Societal Discrimination Through the Spending
Power, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1575, 1576-82 (2002).
15. See, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. at 327 ("Context matters when reviewing race-based
governmental action under the Equal Protection Clause.").
16. See, e.g., Tanya Y. Murphy, An Argument for Diversity Based Affirmative Action in
Higher Education, 1995 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 515, 541-46; Derek Black, Comment, The Case
for the New Compelling Governmental Interest: Improving Educational Outcomes, 80 N.C.
L. REV. 923, 943-63 (2002).
17. See, e.g., Cynthia L. Estlund, Putting Grutter to Work- Diversity, Integration, and
Affirmative Action in the Workplace, 26 BERKELEY J. EMp. & LAB. L. 1, 2-38 (2005); Ronald
Turner, Grutter, the Diversity Justification, and Workplace Affirmative Action, 43 BRANDEIS
L.J. 199, 200, 210-21, 232-36 (2004-2005).
18. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 288 F.3d 732, 810 (6th Cir. 2002) (Boggs, J., dissenting)
(noting that the majority of academics who favor affirmative action are unlikely to have
economically disadvantaged nonminority children who are often adversely affected by such
policies); Robert P. George, Gratz and Grutter: Some Hard Questions, 103 COLUM. L. REV.
1634, 1636 n.13 (2003) (noting the scarcity of academic viewpoints opposed to affirmative
action). But see generally Terry Eastland, The Case Against Affirmative Action, 34 WM. &
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favorable to an expanded diversity rationale,19 despite the Court's
announced principle of "skepticism" toward any race-based
classifications." ° These authors argue that because the Grutter
rationale is rooted in a series of r mconstitutional policy interests
rather than First Amendment academic freedom, it should justify
an expanded use of affirmative action beyond the educational
context.2' Many of these articles focus on Grutter's ramifications for
equal protection interpretation.22 Some articles also address the
possible implications of Grutter for Title VII jurisprudence and the
validity of affirmative action predicated on private workforce
diversity, but they tend to downplay the equal protection and Title
VII questions.23 These articles also do not thoroughly analyze the
limited though instructive equal protection case law from the
United States Courts of Appeals that either anticipates or applied
Grutter's reasoning in employment.24
This Note argues that a proper construction of equal protection
and Title VII demands that, even within the new Grutter frame-
work, the Supreme Court declare many of these diversity-based
affirmative action programs unlawful outside the university
context. It adds to the legal scholarship on affirmative action in
several ways. First, it thoroughly analyzes the limited, though
important and often overlooked, affirmative action case law that
uses the Grutter rationale in the employment setting. Second, this
Note analyzes the legality of the expansion of affirmative action in
employment in both the public and private sectors. This analysis
takes into account the differences in equal protection and Title VII
jurisprudence that many writers overlook or downplay.25 Third, the
analysis of this Note, though not challenging the outcome in
MARY L. REV. 33 (1992) (arguing generally against affirmative action).
19. See supra note 17.
20. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 223 (1995).
21. See, e.g., Estlund, supra note 17, at 14-17, 19-31; Turner, supra note 17, at 206-21,
232-36.
22. See Turner, supra note 17, at 210-19.
23. See Estlund, supra note 17, at 35-38; Cynthia Estlund, Taking Grutter to Work, 7
GREEN BAG 2D 215, 218-24 (2004); Turner, supra note 17, at 232-36.
24. See Turner, supra note 17, at 220-21. Tirner only generally refers to these appellate
cases' use of Grutter to evoke the relevance of observations about an expanded rationale for
affirmative action. See id.
25. See Estlund, supra note 17, at 35-38.
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Grutter, applies an exacting scrutiny to affirmative action in
employment. This exacting scrutiny challenges the majority
academic position that is deferential toward affirmative action.26
Because the Supreme Court has stated that the principle of
"skepticism" should apply to all affirmative action,27 apart from the
actual result of applying this principle, this Note's skeptical
analysis of this momentous unresolved issue is more consistent
with prevailing case law than the challenged prevailing academic
view.
This Note proceeds as follows. Part I of this Note summarizes the
Supreme Court's affirmative action jurisprudence under equal
protection before Grutter. Part II summarizes the affirmative action
jurisprudence under Title VII before Grutter. Part III reviews the
significant equal protection developments of Grutter itself. Part IV
reviews the few lower court decisions on affirmative action pro-
grams in employment based on a diversity rationale, both in
anticipation of the reasoning in Grutter and following that case.
Part V analyzes the constitutionality of expanding the Grutter
diversity rationale to employment in public sector positions subject
to equal protection. Part VI analyzes the legality of a diversity
rationale in private sector employment subject to Title VII. The
Conclusion summarizes the jurisprudential choice the Court must
make regarding affirmative action and recommends that the Court
confine Grutter to the educational context.
I. NARROW RANGE OF INTERESTS THAT JUSTIFIED AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION UNDER EQUAL PROTECTION BEFORE GRUTTER
Before Grutter, the Supreme Court recognized only a narrowly
confined range of policies that could withstand the two-pronged
strict scrutiny test that it uses to evaluate all governmental
burdens imposed on the basis of race.2" First, to withstand this
strict scrutiny test, a racially discriminatory policy must serve
26. See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
27. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
28. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 323-28 (2003); H.L. POHLMAN,
CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATE IN ACTION: CIVIL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES 35-91 (2d ed. 2005).
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governmental interests that are sufficiently "compelling."29 Second,
the means the government uses must be "narrowly tailored" to
serve such an interest.3 ° Interests that the Court has deemed
sufficiently "compelling" have been national security,3 educational
diversity, 2 and remedying specific past discrimination.33 None of
these interests ostensibly justifies an expanded use of affirmative
action in employment for purposes that are not narrowly remedial
or related to national security.
A. National Security
The first interest that the Supreme Court recognized as suffi-
ciently compelling to override the equal protection guarantee was
national security. The Court recognized this interest in Korematsu
v. United States, decided at the height of America's involvement in
World War II." Korematsu arose in response to the forced evacua-
tion of Japanese Americans, a class the government generally
suspected of presenting a heightened risk of disloyalty after the
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.35 Applying a "most rigid scru-
tiny," the Court held that national security was a "pressing public
necessity."36 Given the constitutionally rooted war "power to wage
29. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326. Although the Court has never offered a clear definition of
a "compelling interest," such an interest at least must be more than merely a legitimate or
important governmental interest. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (articulating
"important" governmental interests as sufficient to withstand the less strict intermediate
scrutiny test under equal protection).
30. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326. The Court has interpreted the "narrow tailoring"
requirement of equal protection strict scrutiny to mean that racially discriminatory policies
must closely fit the compelling interest, avoid unduly burdening adversely affected
individuals, avoid using rigid quotas or mechanical formulas, be limited in duration, and
consider race-neutral means of achieving the compelling interest. Id. at 333-43.
31. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 217-20 (1944).
32. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311-14 (1978) (opinion of Powell,
J.).
33. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 490-92 (1989) (O'Connor, J., joined
by Rehnquist, C.J., and White, J.).
34. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 215-17.
35. Id. at 219-20.
36. Id. at 216. This "most rigid scrutiny" is the historical equivalent of "strict scrutiny,"
and "pressing public necessity" is the historical analogue of the compelling interest prong of
strict scrutiny. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 214-15 (1995);
Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216.
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war successfully,"37 and the reality that a lost war against a
dictatorial imperial power would eviscerate any constitutional
guarantees, this holding is sound in the abstract.38 It does not
necessarily riddle the equal protection guarantee with a myriad of
easily satisfied exceptions, so long as the judiciary does not loosely
define the bounds of the constitutionally compelling national
security interest. In the years since Korematsu, the Supreme Court
has not recognized any expansive form of the national security
interest as a rationale to override the equal protection guarantee
against racial discrimination.3 ' This absence of an expansive
interpretation thus indicates the narrowness of equal protection
exceptions before Grutter.
B. Diversity of Viewpoints in Public Higher Education
The next interest that the Supreme Court recognized as constitu-
tionally compelling under equal protection, though not necessarily
under Title VII, was encouraging a diversity of viewpoints in
educational settings. A decisive Supreme Court opinion first
recognized this interest as compelling in 1978 in Bakke.4 ° In that
37. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81,93 (1943) (quoting Charles Evans Hughes,
War Powers Under the Constitution, 42 A.B.A REP. 232, 238 (1917)).
38. Whether the national security interest was genuinely served by the evacuation policy
is a separate matter upon which subsequent information has cast doubt. See Adarand, 515
U.S. at 236; see also infra note 183 and accompanying text (discussing failure of Korematsu
Court to conduct a narrow tailoring inquiry). This level of doubt, however, only undermines
the holding in Korematsu insofar as it upheld the particular means at issue rather than the
national security interest itself.
39. Later, the Court later stated that "Korematsu demonstrates vividly that even the
most rigid scrutiny can sometimes fail to detect an illegitimate racial classification."
Adarand, 515 U.S. at 236.
40. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311-14 (1978) (opinion of Powell,
J.). Although a majority of the Court in Bakke did not join Justice Powell's opinion in
recognizing diversity as compelling, Powell's opinion did decide the outcome of that case. Two
separate groups of four Justices in that case adopted opposite positions on affirmative action.
Powell's opinion agreed with part of both of these groups of Justices on the disposition of the
case, but not their reasoning. Powell's opinion thus became the basis for the use of
affirmative action in higher education up until Grutter. See WOOD, supra note 2, at 210.
Colorable arguments on the legally binding nature of Powell's opinion before Grutter exist
on both sides. Compare Smith v. Univ. of Wash. Law Sch., 233 F.3d 1188, 1199-200 (9th Cir.
2000) (holding that Justice Powell's Bakke opinion was binding), with Hopwood v. Texas, 78
F.3d 932, 944-46 (5th Cir. 1996), vacated, 95 F.3d 53 (5th Cir. 1996) (unpublished table
decision), and Hopwood v. Texas, 236 F.3d 256, 274-75 & n.66 (5th Cir. 2000) (reaching the
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opinion, Justice Powell rooted the diversity interest in another part
of the Constitution: "Academic freedom, though not a specifically
enumerated constitutional right, long has been viewed as a special
concern of the First Amendment. The freedom of a university to
make its own judgments as to education includes selection of its
student body."
41
Justice Powell, however, did not view the perceived constitutional
interest in diversity as granting a broad license to universities to
adopt any kind of affirmative action policy. Because he rooted the
interest in the First Amendment, he narrowly defined the permissi-
ble use of racial diversity in terms of genuine viewpoint diversity.
41
His opinion stated, "[t]he diversity that furthers a compelling state
interest encompasses a far broader array of qualifications and
characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin is but a single though
important element. '43 The racial diversity interest approved in
Bakke thus concerned only an academic freedom interest in
encouraging the "robust exchange of ideas" among students in the
university setting.. Accordingly, the importance of diversity rested
mainly on its internal campus educational value, not on any
postgraduation benefits attributable to racial diversity.45 This
concept of diversity as a compelling interest remained unchanged
until Grutter.46
opposite conclusion about Powell's opinion).
41. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312 (citing Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring in the judgment), and Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S.
589, 603 (1967) (discussing academic freedom as "a special concern of the First
Amendment")).
42. See id. at 313-15.
43. Id. at 315.
44. Id. at 313.
45. The means that the medical school in Bakke chose to advance this diversity interest,
however, did not meet with Justice Powell's approval. Because the medical school used a
rigid sixteen-percent racial quota, Justice Powell concluded that the policy at issue did not
advance his narrow definition of diversity and thus was unconstitutional. Id. at 315-20.
46. The Supreme Court did not again squarely address affirmative action in higher
education until Grutter. The only case before Grutter and after Bakke that addressed any
kind of affirmative action based on diversity was Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, which
evaluated affirmative action in awarding broadcast licenses under the intermediate scrutiny
standard. 497 U.S. 547,554-55, 564-65 (1990). Though a narrow majority upheld the program
as serving "broadcast diversity" under intermediate scrutiny, the Court in Adarand later
overturned Metro's holding that intermediate scrutiny was the proper equal protection
standard, but it did not reevaluate the interest of broadcast diversity. Adarand Constructors,
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C. Remediation of Identifiable Past Discrimination
Before Grutter, the Supreme Court also recognized the interest
of remediation of specific acts of past discrimination against
minorities as sufficiently compelling to justify affirmative action
under equal protection.4" The Court's pre-Grutter strict scrutiny
framework only recognized this interest as compelling within
narrow confines, as it did for other asserted interests.4" These
narrowing principles in evaluating remedial affirmative action have
extended to direct employment by governmental entities as well as
indirect public employment of private entities through public
contracts.49
For all affirmative action programs advanced on remedial
grounds, the Supreme Court has uniformly rejected claims that
government may use affirmative action broadly to remedy past
societal discrimination. The Supreme Court since the 1970s,
therefore, consistently has invalidated policies predicated on the
interest of remediation of societal discrimination as too amor-
phous. o Such policies carry the danger of serving as a permanent
justification for racial discrimination against innocent non-
minorities because those policies are, in the words of Justice Powell,
"ageless in their reach into the past, and timeless in their ability to
affect the future."'" Describing the effect of such policies, Justice
O'Connor later added: 'The dream of a Nation of equal citizens in
a society where race is irrelevant to personal opportunity and
Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
47. See infra notes 53-59 and accompanying text.
48. See infra notes 53-59 and accompanying text.
49. See infra note 53 and accompanying text.
50. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 477-83, 495-506 (1989)
(invalidating a thirty-percent set-aside for minority contractors absent particularized
evidence of discrimination); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 271-72, 274-84
(1986) (plurality opinion) (invalidating a public school district's policy of terminating white
teachers in order to retain black teachers with less seniority absent particularized evidence
of discrimination); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 272-77, 307-10 (1978)
(opinion of Powell, J.) (disapproving societal discrimination as a permissible rationale for a
rigid sixteen-percent quota for a public medical school admissions program).
51. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 276.
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achievement would be lost in a mosaic of shifting preferences based
on inherently unmeasurable claims of past wrongs."52
Consistent with these principles, the Court in its most compre-
hensive treatment of remedial affirmative action, City of Richmond
v. J.A. Croson Co., held that remedial affirmative action is only
justifiable under narrow circumstances.53 First, it must address
past discrimination from within the geographical area that
attempts remedial action, rather than past discrimination in society
at large.54 Second, it must only benefit those groups that have
suffered discrimination in that geographical area, rather than any
group with any minority status.55 Governmental remedial affirma-
tive action within this narrow conceptual framework might be
constitutionally acceptable if the governmental entity could present
evidence of a "gross statistical disparit[y]" between the local
number of minorities who are hired in a given employment area and
the local number who are qualified, willing, and able to perform the
work.56 Such evidence could raise an inference of past governmental
discrimination,57 as could, in the case of government contracting, a
governmental entity's past passive participation in a system of
private discrimination in an industry that must conform to govern-
ment standards.58
Croson's demanding standards, designed "to 'smoke out' illegiti-
mate uses of race" for even purportedly remedial affirmative action
policies, 59 does not allow an expansive use of affirmative action.
This framework endured at least until Grutter.
52. Croson, 488 U.S. at 505-06.
53. Croson considered the City of Richmond's requirement that each of the City's prime
contractors award thirty percent of the dollar amount of the contract to minority-owned
businesses. Id. at 477; see Turner, supra note 17, at 214-15.
54. Croson, 488 U.S. at 505-09.
55. See id. at 506. The challenged plan in Croson benefitted not only blacks but also
Hispanics, Asians, and Aleuts, despite the lack of any evidence of previous discrimination or
even substantial presence of those groups in Richmond's public contracting industry. Id.
56. Id. at 501.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 492 (O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and White, J.).
59. Id. at 493.
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II. EXCLUSIVE NARROW REMEDIAL EXCEPTION TO TITLE VII
BEFORE GRUTTER
Similar to the Court's pre-Grutter jurisprudence on affirmative
action in the public sector, the Court has also constrained the
lawful bounds of affirmative action in the private sector.6" This
interpretation has derived from both the plain meaning of Title
VII's text and a detailed interpretation of congressional intent
in enacting Title VII. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 bans
all racial discrimination by employers who are engaged in inter-
state commerce. 61 The Court recognized this plain meaning of Title
VII only seven years after its enactment when it stated that
"[d]iscriminatory preference for any group, minority or majority, is
precisely and only what Congress has proscribed."62 Five years
later, it applied this principle to allow white employees to challenge
a discriminatory employment discharge in McDonald v. Santa Fe
Trail Transportation Co.6" In an opinion for a unanimous Court,
Justice Thurgood Marshall, one of the staunchest judicial support-
ers of affirmative action,64 noted the consistency of Title VI's
legislative history and subsequent executive implementation with
the principle that the statute "proscribe[s] racial discrimination ...
against whites on the same terms as racial discrimination against
nonwhites."65 Accordingly, Justice Marshall's opinion for the Court
held that Title VII's "terms are not limited to discrimination against
members of any particular race."66
60. See infra Part II.A.
61. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430-31
(1971).
62. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
63. 427 U.S. 273 (1976). The unlawful discrimination occurred when the employer
discharged white employees for misappropriating cargo but did not discharge a black
employee who engaged in the same misconduct. Id. at 275-76, 280 ("We ... hold today that
Title VII prohibits racial discrimination against the white petitioners in this case upon the
same standards as would be applicable were they Negroes and Jackson White.').
64. See, e.g., Croson, 488 U.S. at 528-30 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (defending Richmond's
rigid set-aside for minorities in public contracting under a deferential standard); Regents of
the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 387-402 (1978) (Marshall, J., concurring in the
judgment and dissenting in part) (defending the use of rigid quotas in medical school
admissions).
65. McDonald, 427 U.S. at 279.
66. Id. at 278-79.
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Against this framework, the Supreme Court has recognized only
one narrow exception to the otherwise categorical nondiscrimina-
tion command of Title VII. 7 This exception allows affirmative
action programs that directly serve one of the same specific goals
that motivated Congress to enact Title VII: a desire to remedy the
effects of past blatant discrimination against minorities.6" The
Supreme Court has not considered any nonremedial justification for
affirmative action under Title VII. In individual opinions that did
not speak for a majority of the Court, however, several Supreme
Court Justices have considered affirmative action for the non-
remedial private interest in diversity.6" Moreover, one major Third
Circuit case directly addressed the diversity rationale for affirma-
tive action under Title VII.V O
A. Narrow Remedial Exception to Title VII
In United Steelworkers v. Weber, the Supreme Court first
recognized the remedial exception to Title VII.7' That case consid-
ered the legality of a voluntary private affirmative action plan72 by
Kaiser Aluminum in its skilled craft worker training program."v In
upholding the affirmative action plan, the five-Justice majority
acknowledged the persuasive force of a literal reading of Title VII
under its holding in McDonald, which it did not overturn. 4 It did,
67. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 200-02 (1979).
68. Id. at 201-02.
69. See infra Part II.B. 1.
70. See infra Part II.B.2.
71. See Weber, 443 U.S. at 200-02; Turner, supra note 17, at 222-25.
72. Some practical uncertainty exists about the actual voluntariness of Kaiser's
affirmative action program, given the federal government's threats to withhold public
contracting business from Kaiser if it did not increase the number of racial minorities in its
workforce. See Weber, 443 U.S. at 223 n.2 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The same uncertainty
exists for many private affirmative action programs. By the early 1990s, almost every
Fortune 500 company plus 250,000 others were subject to the requirement that federal
contractors adopt affirmative action policies. See WOOD, supra note 2, at 209-10. The
majority in Weber nevertheless assumed that the plan was voluntary for purposes of its Title
VII analysis. See Weber, 443 U.S at 200.
73. Weber, 443 U.S. at 197-99. The challenged program reserved fifty percent of the
openings in the program for black workers, even if competing with white workers with
greater seniority. Id.
74. See id. at 201.
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however, engage in a thorough review of the legislative history of
the entire Civil Rights Act of 1964 in general and Title VII in
particular.7" The majority's review of this legislative history
indicated that Congress specifically intended the legislation to
integrate blacks into the national economy by "break[ing] down old
patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy."76 The majority thus
held that Kaiser's affirmative action plan reflected the remedial
purposes of Title VII."
Although the majority did not more specifically delineate the
permissible bounds of voluntary private sector affirmative action,
it did focus on several characteristics of the challenged affirmative
action plan that suggest that any remedial exception to Title VII
must be very narrow. First, when it framed the question presented
in the case, the majority characterized its holding as applicable to
"traditionally segregated job categories."78 It further took judicial
notice of the longstanding history of exclusion of blacks from craft
positions.79 Although the majority did not define the degree of past
segregation or discrimination that was necessary before remedial
affirmative action was legally permissible, one member of the five-
Justice majority preferred to narrow the scope of the holding to
affirmative action programs that were "reasonable response [s] to...
'arguable violation[s]' of Title VII" by individual employers. 80 The
same concurring opinion further noted the that the majority
opinion's approach, involving statistical disparities in "traditionally
segregated job categories," was unlikely, in practice, to allow
affirmative action in the absence of an "arguable violation" of Title
VII.81
Second, the Court approvingly observed that the challenged plan
did not "unnecessarily trammel the interests of the white employ-
75. Id. at 201-08.
76. Id. at 208. But see id. at 228-53 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (discussing legislative
history supporting a construction of Title VII that would forbid the affirmative action
program at issue in Weber).
77. Id. at 208 (majority opinion).
78. Id. at 197.
79. Id. at 198 n.1 (citing six United States Courts of Appeals cases on discrimination in
the industry, including one from the Fifth Circuit, within which the plaintiffs Louisiana
plant was located).
80. Id. at 211 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
81. See id. at 213-14.
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ees." 2 It did not create an "absolute bar to the advancement of
white employees" and was a "temporary measure" that lasted only
until "racial imbalance" was eliminated. 3 Together, these two
limiting principles suggest the narrow remedial purposes to which
affirmative action programs in employment must conform. Weber
still did not expressly address the validity of affirmative action
plans for nonremedial purposes.
Since Weber, the Supreme Court has considered only one other
affirmative action plan in employment under Title VII. This
consideration occurred eight years after Weber in Johnson v.
Transportation Agency.84 Like Weber, this case also concerned only
a remedial affirmative action plan in a "traditionally segregated job
classification" in which the preferred group was "significantly
underrepresented.""5 The six-Justice majority in Johnson affirmed
the reasoning of Weber8" and refined its application." In affirming
Weber, despite forceful arguments that it was wrongly decided,s' the
Court asserted that Congress would have overridden Weber's
construction of Title VII if Congress disagreed with that construc-
tion. 9 Because Congress did not override Weber, the Court in
Johnson reasoned that Weber accurately interpreted Congress's
82. Id. at 208 (majority opinion).
83. Id.
84. 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
85. Id. at 620-21. Unlike Weber, Johnson involved the affirmative action plan of a
governmental transportation agency for road dispatcher positions, rather than a private
employer. Id. at 619-21. The Court evaluated the plan under Title VII rather than equal
protection, however, because the plaintiff apparently did not raise the constitutional issue
in the lower court proceedings. Id. at 620 n.2. Also unlike Weber, Johnson concerned
application of affirmative action based on sex, not race, but Johnson applied the same
standard as Weber had, because both race- and sex-based employment discrimination are
prohibited by the same Title VII provision. See Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(a), 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000). Consequently, sex discrimination in employment is arguably
scrutinized more strictly than sex discrimination in areas subject only to equal protection.
See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (establishing intermediate scrutiny for gender
classifications). This difference in scrutiny may have been the reason the plaintiff did not
assert an equal protection claim.
86. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 629 n.7.
87. Id. at 631-42.
88. Id. at 670-74 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Weber, 443 U.S. at 219-55 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
89. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 629 n.7.
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remedial intent behind Title VII.9 ° In refining the Weber doctrine,
the Court in Johnson clarified that the statistical imbalance that
might show the need for remedial action is the disparity between
the preferred minorities in the employer's workforce and the same
category of people in the qualified local labor force."' The qualified
local labor force for jobs requiring special training consists of the
minorities who have those qualifications, rather than all minorities
in the local labor market.92 Because such a statistical imbalance
could exist because of previous societal attitudes rather than actual
employer discrimination, a narrow and localized form of past
societal discrimination could justify remedial affirmative action.93
A broad and generalized justification of remedying national societal
discrimination presumably would not be an adequate justification
for remedial affirmative action under this reasoning, as in Croson.94
This manner of computing statistical imbalance in fact seems
very similar to the standard articulated in Croson under equal
protection. In the constitutional context, such an imbalance allowed
the inference of the employer/contractor's past passive participation
in racial exclusion.95 The majority opinion in Johnson, nevertheless,
did state in a footnote, in response to a contention in the principal
dissent, that the "statutory prohibition ... was not intended to
extend as far as that of the Constitution." 6 The opinion did not
indicate how its approach differed functionally from the equal
protection framework. In fact, even beyond its definition of gross
statistical imbalance, the majority opinion in Johnson reflected the
equal protection approach to remedial affirmative action programs
in other ways. In considering whether the policy "unnecessarily
trammeled" the interests of nonminority workers, the majority
stressed that the minority preferences were not quotas but rather
were temporary and flexible "plus" factors in a holistic case by case
90. Id.
91. See id. at 632.
92. Id. Jobs not requiring special training, as with the position at issue in Johnson, would
have a statistical imbalance based on the number of minorities in the general local labor
force. Id.
93. See Turner, supra note 17, at 227; supra notes 78-81, 85-92 and accompanying text.
94. See supra notes 50-59 and accompanying text.
95. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 501-02 (1989).
96. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 627 n.6.
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analysis."7 This analysis bore great similarity to the approach that
Justice Powell approved under equal protection in his decisive
Bakke opinion-an opinion the majority in Johnson cited with
approval."8 Moreover, Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in
Johnson expressly asserted that, at least for public employers, the
Title VII approach is "no different from that required by the Equal
Protection Clause.""s On the other hand, the three Justices in
dissent explicitly adopted a categorical nondiscriminatory interpre-
tation that would make Title VII more restrictive of employer
affirmative action plans than the Equal Protection Clause is of
government affirmative action plans generally, 100 as those plans
theoretically may be permissible if justified by a "compelling
governmental interest."''
1
Accordingly, although Title VII may or may not reflect the same
requirements as equal protection in all areas, no consensus exists
on the Court, or even in the Johnson majority, that Title VII
necessarily imposes a looser standard than the Equal Protection
Clause does for affirmative action. Under any Justice's interpreta-
tion, Title VII, at the least, seems to incorporate an analysis similar
to, if not exactly identical to, equal protection analysis. Any looser
application of Title VII relative to equal protection, in the context
of Johnson, may involve the extent of proof necessary to prove the
need for a remedial purpose in line with Congressional Title VII
97. See id. at 638-39.
98. Id. at 638.
99. Id. at 649 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). Although Justice O'Connor's
vote was not decisive in Johnson, changes in the Court's composition later made her the
decisive vote in affirmative action matters. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306,343 (2003);
Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 276 (2003) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 204-05 (1995). Furthermore, Justice O'Connor's
recent retirement likely places the more conservative Justice Kennedy in the role of the
decisive vote on affirmative action matters. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 387 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting); Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 631 (1990) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting); Croson, 488 U.S. at 515 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment). These changes in the Court's composition since Johnson suggest that either
Justice O'Connor's view in Johnson on the limits of affirmative action under Title VII or an
even stricter view would be more likely to prevail than the Johnson majority's view if the
Court were to directly decide the question today.
100. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 657 (White, J., dissenting); id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
101. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 327.
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intent, rather than the range of permissible interests that may
justify discriminatory treatment under Title VII.
In refining the proper Title VII framework in affirmative action
programs in employment, the majority opinion in Johnson, like in
Weber, did not address the legality of affirmative action for non-
remedial purposes, such as promoting racial diversity in the
workforce.
B. Other Possible Title VII Exceptions
Though the Supreme Court has never decided the applicability of
Title VII to affirmative action for nonremedial purposes, two
noncontrolling Supreme Court opinions and one lower court case
interpreting Weber and Johnson suggest possible approaches to the
issue.
1. Concurring Opinions in Johnson
First, two concurrences in Johnson offered a window into two
Justices' opinions on the validity of nonremedial affirmative action
programs under Title VII. Justice Stevens's concurring opinion
hinted that Title VII should allow employers the "managerial
discretion" to adopt voluntary affirmative action programs "that
might seem sensible from a business or a social point of view."' 2 He
further suggested that employers might have permissible purposes
for "forward-looking" affirmative action that would "improv[e] their
services to black constituencies, avert[] racial tension over the
allocation of jobs in a community, or increas[e] the diversity of a
work force."' 3 Justice O'Connor, however, disagreed with Justice
Stevens's expansive understanding of permissible nonremedial
purposes for affirmative action by employers under Title VII.O4 She
responded:
102. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 645 (Stevens, J., concurring).
103. Id. at 647 (quoting Kathleen Sullivan, Comment, Sins of Discrmination: Last Term's
Affirmative Action Cases, 100 HARV. L. REv. 78, 96 (1986)).
104. See id. at 649 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
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Contrary to the intimations in Justice Stevens's concurrence,
this Court did not approve preferences for minorities "for any
reason that might seem sensible from a business or a social
point of view." ... Instead of a wholly standardless approach to
affirmative action, the Court determined in Weber that Congress
intended to permit affirmative action only if the employer could
point to a "manifest ... imbalanc[e] in traditionally segregated
job categories."0 5
2. Taxman v. Board of Education
Second, in the 1996 case of Taxman v. Board of Education, the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals squarely decided the approach that
it believed should govern nonremedial affirmative action in
employment under Title VII.O6 In Taxman, a school board fired one
teacher in its business department because of budgetary con-
straints.' °7 In order to promote the diversity of its workforce, the
board decided to fire a white teacher so that the school could retain
a black teacher with equal seniority and qualifications.'0 " Taxman,
the white teacher, filed a Title VII civil rights complaint.0 9
In an en banc decision, the Third Circuit held that the school
district's discriminatory layoff violated Taxman's civil rights under
Title VII10 The eight-judge majority started by reviewing the
Supreme Court's Title VII jurisprudence in McDonald, Weber, and
Johnson, noting the Court's reliance in each case on the congressio-
nal intent behind Title VII."' It then sought to determine whether
racial diversity "mirror[ed] the purposes of the statute.""' 2 The court
105. Id. at 649-50 (quoting id. at 645 (Stevens, J., concurring); United Steelworkers of Am.
v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 197 (1979)).
106. 91 F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996).
107. Id. at 1551.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1552. Because Taxman concerned a public school district, just as Johnson
concerned a public transportation agency, the equal protection clause would seem the most
directly applicable rule of law for the case. But Taxman did not file suit against the district
until the federal government, through the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
unsuccessfully attempted to conciliate the parties. By that time, the statute of limitations for
an equal protection claim based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983 had expired. Id. at 1552 n.5.
110. Justice Alito, then a judge on the Third Circuit, joined the majority opinion in
Taxman. See id. at 1547.
111. Id. at 1553-57.
112. Id. at 1556.
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concluded that only remedial forms of affirmative action justified
unequal treatment in employment under Title VII; therefore,
diversity did not justify discriminatory treatment. 113 It explained:
The statute on its face provides that race cannot be a factor in
employer decisions about hires, promotions, and layoffs, and the
legislative history demonstrates that barring considerations of
race from the workplace was Congress'[s] primary objective. If
exceptions to this bar are to be made, they must be made on the
basis of what Congress has said.... Here, there is no congressio-
nal recognition of diversity as a Title VII objective requiring
accommodation.'
The court further reasoned that the Supreme Court's approval of
diversity for universities under equal protection was irrelevant to
Title VII analysis." 5 It noted Justice Powell's reliance in Bakke on
the role of universities and viewpoint diversity in the First Amend-
ment framework of academic freedom." 6 Unlike the university
setting, the employment setting in Taxman did not clearly implicate
the interest in diversity. The court also noted the difference of
opinion between the concurrences of Justices Stevens and O'Connor
in Johnson and dismissed Justice Stevens's comments about the
permissibility of "forward looking" affirmative action as "not con-
trolling.""' 7
Finally, the Third Circuit evaluated diversity-based affirmative
action under the second prong of Weber, which ascertained whether
the affirmative action program "unnecessarily trammels" the
interests of nonminorities." 8 The court noted that, unlike remedial
affirmative action, diversity-based affirmative action is not
connected to a limited goal, and thus may be invoked whenever a
lack of diversity, whatever the reason, existed in the workforce." 19
Such a policy had the strong possibility of being "an established
113. Id. at 1557-58.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1561-63.
116. Id. at 1561-62.
117. Id. at 1563.
118. Id. at 1564.
119. Id. The school board in Taxman had formulated its affirmative action policy in 1975,
two decades before the case was decided, thereby indicating its possible limitless duration.
Id.
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fixture of unlimited duration.""12 The court concluded that, even if
diversity were a permissible discriminatory purpose under Title
VII, the diversity-based affirmative action program in Taxman
unnecessarily trammeled the interests of others. 121
The majority decision in Taxman produced several vehement
dissents that presented arguments in favor of diversity-based
affirmative action in employment that may have more force in the
post-Grutter legal environment. The principal dissent began with
the questionable assumption, based on Justice Brennan's footnote
in Johnson,122 that, across the board, Title VII imposes a less
demanding restriction on employers than does equal protection. 123
From this assumption, and from the Supreme Court's failure in
Weber and Johnson to adopt a wholly literal interpretation of Title
VII, the Taxman dissent concluded that Title VII did not preclude
employers from using nonremedial affirmative action. 2 1 It further
noted that the Court in Weber and Johnson never held that the
remedial purpose of the policies it upheld was the only permissible
purpose for affirmative action under Title VII. 12' These observations
in the principal dissent overlooked the broader nondiscrimination
Title VII framework established in Griggs and McDonald that
Weber and Johnson only modified but did not overrule. 126
The principal dissent then sought to ascribe to the Congress that
initially adopted Title VII in 1964 a speculative, "forward-looking"
intent that was broader than a merely narrow remedial one. 27 This
intent included several perceived benefits of racial diversity,
including eliminating causes of future discrimination against racial
minorities, 128 dispelling notions of white supremacy, and preparing
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1564-65. The court also discussed the considerably greater burden of being
fired, as Taxman was, than of merely not being hired. Id. at 1564. It analogized the burden
Taxman suffered to the burden suffered by the plaintiff in Wygant, in which the Supreme
Court, applying equal protection analysis, also emphasized the greater burden oftermination
than of not being hired. Id.
122. Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 627 n.6 (1987).
123. Taxman, 91 F.3d at 1568 (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting).
124. See id. at 1569.
125. Id. at 1569-70.
126. See id.; id. at 1553 (majority opinion); see also United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber,
443 U.S. 193, 201 (1979) (citing McDonald without general disapproval).
127. Taxman, 91 F.3d at 1571 (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 1571 (citing H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 18 (1963)).
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students for good citizenship in an increasingly pluralistic society.'29
The majority characterized this broad reading of imputed congres-
sional intent as "a dramatic rewriting of the goals underlying Title
VII [without] support in the Title VII caselaw."'"3 The dissent also
argued that Justice Powell's recognition of universities' interest in
student body diversity as compellinrg under equal protection in
Bakke justified finding, at the least, that the interest in faculty
diversity was likewise sufficiently weighty to override the guaran-
tee of freedom from racial discrimination, whether under equal
protection or Title VII. 1'3
After Weber, Johnson, and Taxman, the Supreme Court's opinion
in Grutter threatened to undermine the carefully crafted framework
of the Court's earlier Title VII and equal protection cases.
III. GRUTTER'S EXPANDED DIVERSITY RATIONALE FOR AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION
Grutter v. Bollinger was the landmark Supreme Court case that
both reaffirmed and expanded the rationale for diversity-based
affirmative action in higher education. Because the expanded
rationale emphasized perceived societal benefits that racially
diverse campuses produce after college graduation, it potentially
also laid the foundation for expanded use of affirmative action to
achieve diversity in employment.
A. The Opinion
Grutter decided an equal protection challenge to the affirmative
action policy of the University of Michigan Law School. This policy
129. Id. at 1572 (citing Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 647 (1987)
(Stevens, J., concurring), and Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 473
(1982)).
130. Id. at 1558 n.9 (majority opinion).
131. Id. at 1573-74 (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting). The disagreements between the dissent and
the majority over the important issue in the case attracted the Supreme Court's attention
and moved the Court to grant certiorari in Taxman. 521 U.S. 1117 (1997). The Court never
heard the case, though, because after the Third Circuit's decision against the affirmative
action policy, a coalition of pro-affirmative action groups, anticipating an unfavorable ruling,
offered Taxman a cash settlement in exchange for withdrawal of her suit. Turner, supra note
17, at 231-32.
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aimed to achieve a "critical mass" of three racial minority groups,
namely blacks, Hispanics, and Native Americans.'32 The law
school's affirmative action program purportedly did not use a
formal quota or automatically award application points to minority
applicants. The law school instead designed its system to use race
as merely a "plus" factor among many other considerations. 3 3 Yet
the law school suspiciously admitted a percentage of preferred
minority students that varied little from year to year, and in fact
was almost identical to the percentage of each preferred minority
group in each year's applicant pool. 134 Like other affirmative action
programs, this program regularly admitted members of preferred
minority groups with substantially lower undergraduate grades and
standardized test scores than rejected white and non-preferred
minority applicants. 135 A bitterly divided Court held that the
achievement of the "educational benefits that flow from a diverse
student body" was a "compelling [governmental] interest" that justi-
fied racial discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause, and
that the law school's policy was "narrowly tailored" to that "compel-
ling interest.
136
Justice O'Connor's opinion for the five-Justice majority in Grutter
affirmed Justice Powell's holding in Bakke that student body
diversity constituted a countervailing compelling interest rooted in
First Amendment academic freedom. 1 7 Her use of the First
Amendment, however, was much more muted than Justice Powell's
reliance on it in Bakke. In a considerably briefer exposition than
Justice Powell's Bakke analysis, Justice O'Connor summarized
Justice Powell's understanding of a constitutional conception of
132. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 316 (2003). The law school's policy preferred
members of these racial minority groups over other minority groups such as Asians, who did
not receive a similar "plus" benefit in their applications. See id. at 319.
133. Id. at 334-35. The law school's policy stood in contrast to the University of Michigan
undergraduate institution's affirmative action program, which used a point system that
automatically awarded minority candidates one-fifth of the points needed for admission.
Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270 (2003). The Supreme Court declared this policy
unconstitutional. Id.
134. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 383-86 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); id. at 390-91 (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting). These statistical conditions at least suggested a disguised quota that considered
race as more than a mere "plus" factor.
135. See Brief of Petitioner at 7, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241).
136. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343-44.
137. Id. at 329.
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academic freedom that encompasses the freedom of universities to
select their student body.' This conception of academic freedom,
as Justice Powell previously stated, promoted a "robust exchange
of ideas."'139 But beyond this brief exposition of academic freedom,
as one legal scholar later observed, "Justice O'Connor never
explicitly rested her own conclusion on the First Amendment. Her
references to the First Amendment cited what the Court or Justice
Powell had done in the past; she did not explicitly adopt those
sources as reflecting the Grutter Court's interpretation.' 4 °
Instead, Justice O'Connor's majority opinion in Grutter empha-
sized the more generic benefits of educational diversity rather
than its purely educational value. These benefits included, in
addition to "livelier" class discussions, such benefits as promoting
"cross-racial understanding," breaking down racial stereotypes, and
generally preparing students for "work and citizenship" in a global
economy. 141 The majority opinion specifically noted the importance
that major American businesses, such as General Motors, placed on
having a diverse workforce trained in a diverse setting.142 Another
perceived benefit was an improvement in civic legitimacy that
would flow from increasing the number of minorities in positions of
businessand political leadership. 43 Justice Powell's Bakke opinion,
in stark contrast, made only one passing reference to the broader
benefits of racial diversity to life after graduation from institutions
of higher education.'4
Apart from the majority's understanding of the compelling
benefits to diversity, the use of greater deference in assessing the
138. Id. (citing Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring), and Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)).
139. Id. (quoting Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603).
140. Joel K. Goldstein, Beyond Bakke: Grutter-Gratz and the Promise of Brown, 48 ST.
Louis U. L.J. 899, 925 (2004).
141. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330-31.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 332-33. Some legal academics have described these operational interests as part
of a collective interest in the further racial connectedness and integration of American
society. See Estlund, supra note 17, at 15-17, 23-31.
144. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 314 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.)
("An otherwise qualified medical student with a particular background ... may bring to a
professional school of medicine experiences, outlooks, and ideas that enrich the training of
its student body and better equip its graduates to render with understanding their vital
service to humanity."); Goldstein, supra note 140, at 946.
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diversity rationale was another prominent feature of the majority
opinion in Grutter that distinguished it from Justice Powell's Bakke
opinion. The strict scrutiny test for any racial discrimination by the
government, including affirmative action in public universities, is
by definition a "most searching judicial inquiry"'45 that "smoke[s]
out illegitimate uses of race."'46 In the past, strict scrutiny rendered
all governmental racial discrimination "presumptively invalid."'4
Yet Justice O'Connor in Grutter approached the University of
Michigan Law School's judgment that diversity was vital to its
operational mission as "one to which we defer."'48 In so doing, her
opinion for the Court presumed the law school's good faith in
implementing its program, and also required only "good faith
consideration of workable race-neutral alternatives" in achieving
diversity.'49 Because of the Court's increased deference, one legal
academic has described this version of strict scrutiny as a "curious
methodology" and "something of an oxymoron."'150 Justice Kennedy,
in dissent, similarly described Justice O'Connor's approach as one
that "distort [ed]" and "manipulated" conventional strict scrutiny.' 5 '
B. Resulting Opening for Expanded Affirmative Action After
Grutter
Justice O'Connor's majority opinion in Grutter did not explicitly
articulate a more deferential approach for any affirmative action in
contexts other than higher education. But Justice Scalia's brief
dissenting opinion pointedly highlighted the expansive nature of the
Court's diversity rationale:
The "educational benefit" that the University of Michigan
seeks to achieve ... is a lesson of life rather than law-essentially
145. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 236 (1995).
146. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (O'Connor, J., joined
by Rehnquist, C.J., and White, J.).
147. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 234.
148. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328.
149. Id. at 339, 343. The majority did not deem this presumption to have been rebutted
by the statistical evidence that the means the law school used to advance its diversity
interest closely resembled mere racial balancing rather than the use of race as only one of
many factors. See id. at 338-39; id. at 383-85 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
150. Goldstein, supra note 140, at 924.
151. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 387 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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the same lesson taught to ... people three feet shorter and 20
years younger than the full-grown adults at the University of
Michigan Law School, in institutions ranging from Boy Scout
troops to public-school kindergartens. If properly considered an
"educational benefit" at all, it is surely not one that is either
uniquely relevant to law school or uniquely "teachable" in a
formal educational setting. 5 '
Justice Scalia's opinion then sarcastically applied the majority's
reasoning to affirmative action in public and private employment:
If it is appropriate for the University of Michigan Law School to
use racial discrimination for the purpose of putting together a
"critical mass" that will convey generic lessons in socialization
and good citizenship, surely it is no less appropriate-indeed,
particularly appropriate-for the civil service system of the
State of Michigan to do so.... And surely private employers
cannot be criticized-indeed, should be praised-if they also
"teach" good citizenship to their adult employees through a
patriotic, all-American system of racial discrimination in hiring.
The nonminority individuals who are deprived of a legal
education, a civil service job, or any job at all by reason of their
skin color will surely understand."5 3
Actual employment practices in recent times validate Justice
Scalia's concern that the Court's expansive diversity rationale in
Grutter may validate an increase in discriminatory affirmative
action policies outside of higher education. Bakke's approval of
diversity-based affirmative action, perhaps because it was limited,
did not have this effect on employers; many businesses, consistent
with Weber, instead justified any limited affirmative action policies
as remedying the effects of past local discrimination.'5 4 But by the
152. Id. at 347 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Scalia's
opinion, which Justice Thomas joined, concurred only in the majority's concluding suggestion
that public sector affirmative action might be unconstitutional after twenty-five more years.
Id.; id. at 375-78 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). But Justice Scalia
also believed the policies were equally unconstitutional at the time. Id. at 346 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). Because the dissenting portion comprised most
of Justice Scalia's opinion, this Note refers to it as a dissent.
153. Id. at 347-48.
154. WOOD, supra note 2, at 210.
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late 1990s, the remedial justification likely became difficult for
employers to justify, as the Court made clear that societal discrimi-
nation would not suffice as a legal rationale155 and as patterns of
identifiable discrimination became increasingly rare.156 Public
sector employers and private sector businesses presumably took
note of their constricted legal options for pursuing preferential
policies. At the same time, birth and immigration patterns were
leading to a more racially heterogeneous workforce and consumer
market. Sometime exaggerated projections of the magnitude of
these increasing percentages of racial minorities in the population
and workforce led to a panic of sorts in the business world about its
ability to satisfy consumer and labor markets. 157 And any racial
imbalance, from whatever cause, continued to attract threats of
boycotts and activists such as Reverend Jesse Jackson.'58 These
actions thereby threatened businesses' bottom lines, regardless of
any intrinsic value of a diverse workforce from their perspective. 5 9
By the 1990s, under these demographic and political influences,
the generalized concept of diversity, with an emphasis on racial
diversity, became a fashionable part of business and popular
culture. Fortune magazine made diversity a criterion in its annual
rankings of American businesses. 6 ° Employers' affirmative action
policies adapted and expanded to become diversity-focused policies.
Businesses hired consultants to serve as "diversity trainers" for
their employees.' They also conducted targeted recruitment of
minorities at elite universities.6 2 Affirmative action in the form of
racial discrimination in hiring decisions was a natural byproduct
of this culture.16 The Supreme Court's decision to hear Grutter
155. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 499-500 (1989); Wygant v.
Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274-76 (1986) (plurality opinion).
156. See supra note 4.
157. WOOD, supra note 2, at 204-09.
158. See, e.g., KENNETHR. TIMMERMAN, SHAKEDOWN: EXPOSINGTHEREALJESSEJACKSON
127-30, 132-34, 273-78, 280-84 (2002) (discussing boycotts or lawsuits against Coca-Cola,
Anheuser-Busch, Texaco, and Viacom that extracted affirmative action policies from those
companies).
159. WOOD, supra note 2, at 214.
160. Id. at 215.
161. Id. at 204.
162. See Brief for Amici Curiae 65 Leading American Businesses in Support of
Respondents at 1, Grutter v. Boliinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (Nos. 02-241, 02-516).
163. See WOOD, supra note 2, at 211, 217, 223.
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then provided an opportunity for businesses to demonstrate
their commitment to racial diversity and affirmative action. Some
of the largest American businesses, such as General Motors,
Microsoft, 3M, and Boeing, submitted amicus briefs in support of
the University of Michigan's affirmative action policies." 4 Justice
O'Connor's majority opinion in Grutter specifically noted these
briefs in defining its expansive instrumental version of the diversity
rationale for affirmative action.'65 The convergence of Grutter's
expansion of the diversity rationale and American business's
apparent embrace of diversity as a rationale for affirmative action
thus render the potential application of Grutter to affirmative
action in employment a ripe legal issue.
IV. UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS CASES EVALUATING
DIVERSITY JUSTIFICATIONS IN EMPLOYMENT
The Supreme Court has not yet decided an affirmative action
case on the diversity rationale in employment.'66 The United States
Courts of Appeals, however, have decided a handful of cases dealing
with affirmative action in employment. These cases either antici-
pated the Grutter rationale or, after Grutter, applied it to affirma-
tive action in public sector employment."' All such cases have been
164. See Brief for Amici Curiae 65 Leading American Business in Support of Respondents,
supra note 162, at 1; Brief of General Motors Corp. as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Respondents at 1, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241).
165. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330-31.
166. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Parents Involved in Community Schools U.
Seattle School District No. 1, 126 S. Ct. 2351 (2006) (mem.), which deals with the application
of the expanded Grutter diversity rationale to K-12 education. The Court's decision in that
case may indicate the Court's general receptiveness to that rationale in nonuniversity
settings. Additionally, Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, wrote a post-Grutter
opinion in response to the Court's denial of certiorari in a public contracting case involving
a deferential application of strict scrutiny to an affirmative action plan promoted under a
remedial interest. See Concrete Works of Colo., Inc. v. City & County of Denver, 540 U.S.
1027, 1027 (2003) (mem.) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
167. Two other cases dealing with public contracting by private business entities have
used deference similar to Grutter's in applying strict scrutiny to public contracting
affirmative action, even though it was premised on remedial rather than diversity grounds.
See Sherbrooke Turf, Inc. v. Minn. Dep't of Transp., 345 F.3d 964, 973-74 (8th Cir. 2003)
(upholding a remedial affirmative action program in public contracting after applying the
deferential form of "strict scrutiny," using specific language from Grutter, in considering race
neutral alternatives and the closeness of the fit between the remedial interest and chosen
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decided under equal protection; no cases on diversity-based
affirmative action in private sector employment under Title VII
have yet arisen."' All these cases addressed a particular form of
the diversity rationale, namely that diversity in the workplaces
examined--correctional institutions and police forces--creates
profession-specific benefits of increased operational effectiveness.
This rationale, however, rests on the purported ability of minority
correctional and police officers to address the needs of racial
minorities with whom they interact better than white officers could.
This reasoning is substantially parallel to the general employment
diversity and effectiveness rationale that has emerged more
clearly with Grutter. The reasoning in these cases, therefore,
presages the later arguments for a more expansive application of
means); Concrete Works of Colo., Inc. v. City & County of Denver, 321 F.3d 950, 959 (10th
Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1027 (2003) (mem.) (applying deference similar to Grutter
in finding a compelling remedial interest and in placing the burden on the plaintiff to show
the absence of the compelling interest); Teresa Lee Brown, Note, Deceived by Disparity
Studies: Why the Tenth Circuit Failed To Apply Croson's Strict Scrutiny Standard in
Concrete Works of Colorado, 81 DEN. U. L. REV. 573 passim (2004); see also Concrete Works,
540 U.S. at 1027 (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (suggesting that the
Supreme Court's failure to reverse a deferential lower court decision on remedial affirmative
action in public contracting signified that Grutter silently overrode the strict holdings of
Croson and Adarand). But see Hershell Gill Consulting Eng'rs, Inc. v. Miami-Dade County,
333 F. Supp. 2d 1305, 1318-32 (S.D. Fla. 2004) (invalidating a remedial affirmative action
program as not advancing remedial interest and as not narrowly tailored, given imprecise
statistical proof and county's failure to consider race-neutral alternatives as required under
both Croson and Grutter).
168. The United States Courts of Appeals have also decided several cases applying Grutter
to diversity-based affirmative action in primary and secondary education. The general
tendency in these cases is to allow the diversity rationale in these schools, though they are
different from the university setting. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch.
Dist., No. 1, 426 F.3d 1162, 1166 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 2351 (2006) (mem.)
(upholding a "racial tiebreaker" in evaluating transfer applications within a K-12 public
school system as narrowly tailored to a compelling interest in student diversity); Comfort v.
Lynn Sch. Comm., 418 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2005) (upholding the use of a similar "racial
tiebreaker" in a public K-12 school system); J. Kevin Jenkins, Are Federal Courts Comfort-
able with Diversity Rationale in K-12Public Schools?, 198 ED. LAw. REP. 21,22 (2005) (noting
the tendency toward expansion of the diversity rationale to affirmative action in K-12 public
education). The Supreme Court may soon halt this tendency. See Parents Involved, 126 S.
Ct. at 2351 (granting certiorari in the Ninth Circuit K-12 case). Additionally, the Ninth
Circuit has upheld another affirmative action policy based on a diversity interest in a public
law school as narrowly tailored, despite the law school's policy of segregating all applicants
who fall within the intermediate "discretionary" zone and making decisions on minorities'
applications before any nonminority candidates in the "discretionary" zone. Smith v. Univ.
of Wash., 392 F.3d 367, 380 (9th Cir. 2004).
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the diversity rationale for affirmative action in the employment
context generally.
A. United States Courts of Appeals Cases Anticipating the
Grutter Rationale
Two notable pre-Grutter cases from the Seventh Circuit antici-
pated the Grutter diversity rationale in public employment cases.
These cases, concerning corrections institutions and police forces,
considered the asserted justifications for the affirmative action
policies under the Adarand standard for strict scrutiny of all forms
of racial discrimination.
1. Wittmer v. Peters: Employment Diversity Interest in Boot
Camp Penal Institutions
The first important case that recognized as compelling a diversity
rationale for affirmative action in an area other than higher
education was Wittmer v. Peters.169 This 1996 case from the Seventh
Circuit, seven years before Grutter, involved a challenge to the
practice of an Illinois military-style "boot camp" that served as an
alternative form of punishment for young convicts without exten-
sive prior criminal histories." 0 When the boot camp first opened in
1993, sixty-eight percent of the 200 inmates were black, while only
two of the forty-eight correctional officers and two of the ten
lieutenants were also black.'"' Because the facility was newly
constructed, any claims of past discrimination against minorities as
the basis for remedial affirmative action would have been implausi-
ble. Instead, the state implemented an affirmative action policy to
hire more black employees to advance the interest of "penological
necessity."'' 2 The state denied a lieutenant position to the three
white plaintiffs in favor of a black applicant, despite the plaintiffs'
significantly better performance on a standard test given to all
169. 87 F.3d 916 (7th Cir. 1996).
170. Id. at 917.
171. Id.
172. Id.
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applicants.' 3 The three white plaintiffs claimed that the state
policy violated their constitutional rights to equal protection."'
In Judge Richard Posner's brief five-page opinion for the three-
judge panel-a relatively short opinion for such an important and
novel constitutional question'--the Seventh Circuit upheld the
affirmative action employment program." 6 Applying what pur-
ported to be strict scrutiny, Judge Posner insisted that any
governmental entity asserting a nonremedial compelling govern-
mental interest, including penological necessity, must clearly
substantiate the need for that interest.'7 7 Judge Posner also stated
"common sense is not enough; common sense undergirded the
pernicious discrimination against blacks now universally regret-
ted."'7 8 Then, without the benefit of guiding Supreme Court
precedent on any permissible nonremedial compelling interests, he
concluded that the state could more effectively rehabilitate the
predominantly black convicts with high-ranking black employees,
given the institution's purpose of "pacification and reformation" of
its inmates." 9 The state in Wittmer had presented expert witnesses
who testified to the necessity of black corrections officers.' 0 This
evidence, in the court's view, satisfied the government's evidentiary
burden of establishing a compelling interest based on more than
mere speculation.' Finally, Judge Posner limited the court's
holding to penal institutions that have the stated demonstrable
need, rather than "ordinary prison[s], in which the guards do not
interact with the inmates in the same fierce intimacy as in a boot
camp.' 82
173. Id. The plaintiffs ranked third, sixth, and eighth on the test, while the black applicant
ranked forty-second. Id.
174. See id.
175. Compare id. at 917-21, with Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 311-44 (2003)
(occupying thirty-three pages of the U.S. Reports), and Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265, 269-324 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.) (occupying fifty-five pages of the U.S.
Reports).
176. Wittmer, 87 F.3d at 921.
177. Id. at 918.
178. Id. at 919.
179. Id. at 920.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
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Wittmer was a pioneering case involving a unique situation with
conceivably profound consequences. It did not purport to directly
apply even the Bakke precedent on diversity as a compelling
interest in higher education. It also did not have the benefit of
Grutter to channel its analysis on the benefits of greater numbers
of minorities in the workforce. Its analysis instead derived from the
court's own independent judgment of the merits of the penological
necessity interest, which was very similar to the general employ-
ment diversity interest. Wittmer did not, however, claim that the
underlying penological interest was sufficiently rooted in a counter-
vailing constitutional interest that could override the guarantee
against governmental racial discrimination. It also did not explain
why rehabilitation of the relatively small number of inmates in the
boot camp system was sufficiently weighty an interest to override
a fundamental constitutional right. Unlike Korematsu, the Wittmer
situation did not involve national or internal security that would be
in danger without racial discrimination.
183
Wittmer thus anticipated the freewheeling manner of judicial
reasoning used in Grutter. The Wittmer court employed an employ-
ment diversity rationale that is potentially generalizeable to other
employment settings. But it also approved diversity-based affirma-
tive action in employment only at an institution with particular
racial sensitivities beyond those that exist in the general employ-
ment setting. It did not, in contrast to the later decision in Grutter,
articulate a diversity-based rationale for affirmative action that on
its own swept beyond the facts of the case. Though improved
operational service arguably may be an important interest for all
183. Cf. supra Part I.A (discussing Korematsu). The opinion in Wittmer, however, did bear
a striking resemblance to a discredited component of Korematsu. See Adarand Contractors,
Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 215, 236 (1995) (disapproving the case-specific disposition of
Korematsu on narrow tailoring grounds). Neither opinion conducted a narrow tailoring
inquiry. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223-24 (1944). After finding the
security interests to be compelling, the courts did not go on to determine whether the
government could pursue the same security interest in a less burdensome manner. This
unexplained absence of any narrow tailoring inquiry stands in marked contrast to even the
otherwise deferential approach to strict scrutiny the Grutter Court later adopted.
Presumably, even the Grutter framework would have considered race-neutral ways of
achieving the secuirty interest, as well as employment policies that offered less mechanical
preferences in favor of minority applicants. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 333-43
(2003).
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types of employment, the reasoning in Wittmer is readily con-
fineable to the boot camp context.
2. Reynolds v. City of Chicago: Recognition of Employment
Diversity and Operational Effectiveness as Compelling Interests
in Police Forces
In Reynolds v. City of Chicago, the Seventh Circuit addressed a
diversity-based affirmative action program in the hiring practices
of the Chicago police department."M Reynolds, decided just one
year before Grutter, involved an equal protection challenge of the
promotion of twenty black and Hispanic officers to lieutenant and
captain over white policemen who were more objectively qual-
ified.185 The Seventh Circuit, in another opinion authored by Judge
Posner, upheld the discriminatory promotions policy.'86 It upheld
the promotions of the black police officers on a conventional version
of the remedial rationale, based on a jury's finding that the police
department discriminated against blacks in hiring during a period
of racial tensions in the 1960s in Chicago.'87 Because no evidence of
such discrimination against Hispanics existed, however, the court
did not use the remedial rationale to uphold the affirmative action
plan as applied to Hispanics. 8 Instead, the court upheld the
program under the City's alternate rationale of enhancing the
"operational needs of the police force."'8 9
Judge Posner's opinion for the court, remarkably brief as in
Wittmer, accepted the City's assertions on the purported operational
benefits of greater diversity among police supervisors. First, greater
numbers of Hispanic lieutenants and captains would "set the tone
for the department" in making it "sensitized to any special problems
184. 296 F.3d 524 (7th Cir. 2002).
185. Assessment of objective qualifications of the competing police officers was based on
performance on the police department's standardized test. Id. at 525-26. The challenged
promotion decisions also included objectively less qualified female police officers. Id. These
promotions involve sex-based affirmative action policies that are beyond the scope of this
Note.
186. See id. at 528-30.
187. Id. at 528-29.
188. Id. at 529.
189. Id. at 529-30.
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in policing Hispanic neighborhoods.""19 Second, these Hispanic
supervisors would allow the police to function as better 'ambassa-
dors' to the various communities that make up Chicago, of which
the Hispanic community is an important one."19' These "ambassa-
dors" purportedly would be better able to gain the "trust of that
community."'92
In assessing these benefits, Judge Posner began with a seemingly
stringent statement on the dangers of recognizing nonremedial
justifications for affirmative action as constitutionally compelling:
Justifications of discrimination that are based on a public
employer's operational needs are suspect, because they seem to
have no natural limits, unlike remedial justifications, which
cease when the last traces of the discrimination that gave rise
to the remedy have been eliminated.... To allow discrimination
on the basis that it was efficient or expedient would cause
inroads into equal protection that the courts are unwilling to
countenance. 193
Judge Posner, however, went on to approve the City's nonremedial
affirmative action policy with only somewhat perfunctory scrutiny
in only two paragraphs of text that occupied less than one page of
the Federal Reporter.'94 His opinion simply noted that courts had
occasionally allowed nonremedial forms of affirmative action for
police and correctional institutions, as in Wittmer.'95 It then applied
a balancing test that resembled intermediate scrutiny more than
strict scrutiny. This balancing test weighed the need for effective
police work in an era of public fears of "international terrorism"
against the injury suffered by the white plaintiffs in the case.'9 6
The court's application of this balancing test both overstated the
benefits of the affirmative action program and understated its
human costs on adversely impacted individuals and on society:
190. Id.
191. Id. at 530.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. See id. at 530-31.
195. Id. at 530.
196. Id.
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If it is indeed the case that promoting one Hispanic police
sergeant out of order is important to the effectiveness of the
Chicago police in protecting the people of the city from crime,
the fact that this out-of-order promotion technically is "racial
discrimination," though its impact, incidence, and motivation
are remote from the impact, incidence, and motivation that have
shaped the current legal view of racial discrimination, does not
strike us as an impressive counter-weight.
197
The court then ended with the conclusory statement that "the city
proved that it has a compelling need to increase the number of
Hispanic lieutenants."'98 The court did not indicate why it believed
the City met this high burden, whether through reliance on expert
witnesses, as in Wittmer, or on a genuinely independent constitu-
tional analysis of the asserted governmental interest. Like in
Wittmer, the court also did not conduct an explicit narrow tailoring
analysis. Instead, it simply noted that the case involved the
promotion of only one less objectively qualified Hispanic officer.'99
Judge Posner's opinion in Reynolds thus contained many of the
same lax analytical qualities as his opinion in Wittmer. Like
Wittmer, Reynolds did not apply directly even the Bakke precedent
on diversity as a compelling interest. It did not define with
particularity the precise interest that the Chicago policy served, nor
did it define that interest as rooted in the Constitution. It also did
not apply a narrow tailoring analysis. Like Wittmer, however,
Reynolds's interest in operational effectiveness was confined to the
particular context of the case, not a broad diversity interest in
employment analogous to the interest at issue in Grutter.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 530-31.
199. See id. at 531 ("ITihe increase it defended ... is the smallest increase it could have
made."). Even under Grutter, such an analysis at least would have required that the City of
Chicago consider each police officer as an individual, without placing a reflexive premium on
minority status. A more holistic evaluation could consider each supervisor candidate's
individual sensitivity to diverse ethnic communities, on the assumption that particular white
police officers might, like minorities, also be able to serve as effective "ambassadors" to
diverse communities.
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B. The Seventh Circuit's Application of Grutter to the Diversity
Rationale in Police Forces
Only one U.S. appellate court, again the Seventh Circuit, has
addressed an affirmative action program in public sector employ-
ment based on operational effectiveness grounds after Grutter. The
Seventh Circuit again addressed a preferential promotions policy
of the Chicago police department in Petit v. City of Chicago.200 This
preferential policy involved the City's handling of another series of
sergeant promotion in the mid-1980s. °' Unlike the promotions in
Reynolds, the City based these promotions almost entirely on
standardized test results, including a written examination, an oral
examination, and a performance evaluation.2 °2 But in order to
increase the number of blacks and Hispanics given promotions the
City "standardized" all scores on the basis of each officer's race so
that members of minority groups who generally underperformed
would receive an automatic boost in their scores. 0 3 More than one
hundred black and Hispanic officers won promotions based on
either the standardized test scores or out-of-rank-order pro-
motions. °4 Eighty-two white police officers whom the City denied
promotions claimed that the City's policy violated their equal
protection rights.20 5 The City claimed both remedial and operational
effectiveness justifications for its affirmative action policy.206
Because of the complex procedural posture of the case,20 7 the court
considered only the diversity rationale based on the claimed benefit
of enhanced operational effectiveness. 0 '
The question before the court then resembled the portion of
Reynolds that approved the promotion of the single Hispanic officer
on operational effectiveness grounds. But Petit involved a greater
200. 352 F.3d 1111 (7th Cir. 2003).
201. Id. at 1116.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 1117.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 1113, 1117. Three-hundred twenty-six nonminority police officers originally
sued, but the court allowed only eighty-two officers to proceed with the suit because of
standing issues. Id. at 1112-13.
206. Id. at 1112.
207. See id. at 1113.
208. See id. at 1114.
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number of promotions, for diversity purposes and the Petit court
explicitly tailored its analysis to conform to the standards of
Grutter. °s In explicating its understanding of the compelling
interest prong of strict scrutiny, the Petit court first noted the
Grutter Court's deference to the university in defining its own
educational mission in relation to the value of student body
diversity.21 ° It also emphasized Grutter's dicta that a racially
diverse military officer corps was vital to national security. 211 It
then invoked a portion of the expansive language in Grutter that
exalted civic inclusiveness and societal legitimacy as benefits of
increased racial diversity. 12 But it did not cite any language from
Bakke or Grutter about a constitutionally rooted countervailing
interest in higher education.
Applying the compelling-interest prong of strict scrutiny as
refined by Grutter, the Petit court applied a parallel "degree of
deference" to the police experts' and executives' understanding of
their own operational needs.213 The court did not explain why police
forces were entitled to the same degree of deference accorded to
universities, but it did discuss the nature of the asserted diversity
rationale in somewhat greater detail than in Reynolds. The court
credited the testimony of a professor of criminal justice that, absent
police diversity, racial minorities have a greater tendency than
nonminorities to distrust the police and refrain from cooperating
with them.21 4 Moreover, it credited the testimony of a police chief
from another city that racial diversity among police supervisors
would "internally ... chang[e] the attitudes of officers."21 5 The court
further favorably acknowledged the testimony of Chicago police
209. See id. at 1112 ("Today, odd as it may seem, we must evaluate the hoary examination
based on the standards set out just this year by the United States Supreme Court in two
affirmative action cases involving student admissions at the University of Michigan."). The
second affirmative action case was Gratz v. Bollinger, which invalidated the University of
Michigan undergraduate affirmative action policy as not narrowly tailored and as the
functional equivalent of a quota system. 539 U.S. 244, 270 (2003); see supra note 133.
210. Petit, 352 F.3d at 1114.
211. Id.
212. Id. (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 332 (2003) ("Furthermore, in the
Court's words, the '[elffective participation by members of all racial and ethnic groups in the
civic life of our Nation is essential if the dream of one Nation, indivisible, is to be realized.")).
213. Id. at 1114 (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328).
214. Id. at 1114-15.
215. Id. at 1115.
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executives that "the presence of minority sergeants has not only
improved police-community cooperation, but also diffused poten-
tially explosive situations, such as the tense racial situation
following riots in the 1980's in a predominately Hispanic commu-
nity."21 This rationale thus reflected the Reynolds reasoning that
a diverse police force would better be able to serve as "ambassadors
to the community" who could win the "trust of the community" and
"detect[] and apprehend[]" more criminals.217 The court did not
demand any more concrete evidence that race, rather than other
factors, was needed to achieve operational effectiveness for any
specific community problems that existed in the social context at
the time the city adopted its preferential policy. Based on the expert
witnesses' claims, the court simply held that diversity in the police
force was a compelling governmental interest under Grutter.218
The Seventh Circuit's evaluation of Chicago's employment
diversity rationale in Petit was a significant application and
expansion of Grutter. For the first time after that landmark
Supreme Court case, a federal court had applied it to an affirmative
action program in the employment context based on a diversity
rationale. And in contrast to Reynolds, which used diversity to
justify the promotion of only one officer, it applied the diversity
rationale to uphold a promotion of many minority employees.
Furthermore, Petit's reference to Grutter signified a more expansive
understanding of the diversity rationale in employment than the
earlier Seventh Circuit cases had embraced. Although the court
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. Regarding the post-Grutter narrow tailoring prong of strict scrutiny, the Petit
court asserted that the preferred minority officers and the rejected nonminority officers
"were fairly uniformly qualified for promotion" in view of the proximity of their scores and
the examination's standard error. Id. at 1117. It did not condemn the automatic, mechanical
nature of the "plus" that the standardization procedure provided all minority officers,
regardless of actual contributions of community relations ability to the force. It noted that
the results of the challenged examination policy had not been used since 1991 and that "no
race-conscious promotions have been made since that time." Id. Because this purportedly
limited affirmative action policy met the Grutter requirement of being "limited in time," the
court held that the Chicago police's policy was narrowly tailored and thus did not violate
equal protection. Id. at 1117-18. In so doing, the court did not examine any race-neutral
alternative means that the City may have considered to achieve its goal of operational
effectiveness, such as preferring officers with language skills or community relations
excellence regardless of racial identity.
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addressed the diversity rationale in the context of a profession
concerned with internal security, as in Reynolds and Wittmer, it
rooted this rationale in Grutter's much broader dicta on civic
inclusiveness and societal legitimacy-concepts that may not be
readily confineable to either universities or law enforcement.
And the Seventh Circuit so reasoned without reference to any
countervailing constitutional interest in security or in the First
Amendment. Moreover, Petit's reasoning, although somewhat more
elaborate than that in Wittmer and Reynolds, replicated the loose
scrutiny in application of some aspects of the affirmative action
program, particularly those related to the unsubstantiated claim of
a compelling security interest. Petit thus was a sweeping affirma-
tion of affirmative action that, despite its more accurate acknowl-
edgment of the strict scrutiny test, was somewhat broader than
both Reynolds and Wittmer.
These cases from the courts of appeals thus show the ripeness of
several important issues that Grutter raised but did not answer.
What is the proper scope of the racial diversity rationale for
affirmative action under equal protection? More specifically, should
the courts expand the diversity rationale to the employment
context? If so, should the expansion encompass employment
generally or only a select subcategory of employment in which racial
sensitivities are particularly important? Furthermore, how should
Grutter and the debate over the diversity rationale in public
employment affect the interpretation of Title VII? Is the general
diversity rationale important enough to imply a diversity exception
to Title VII? What is the proper influence of the legislative history
and purpose of Title VII on the consideration of a possible diversity
exception to the statute? These questions invite eventual resolution
by the Supreme Court. The following two Parts of this Note suggest
that the appropriate resolution of these questions is in favor of
containing the diversity rationale of Grutter.
V. UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF EXPANDING THE DIVERSITY
RATIONALE TO PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT UNDER EQUAL PROTECTION
The case for expanding the diversity rationale to public employ-
ment is fairly straightforward and arguably plausible under
Grutter. But the countervailing constitutional interests that the
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Court used to justify its decision in Grutter are not present in the
employment-diversity context. And, apart from any countervailing
constitutional interests, even if the policy interests supporting
diversity-based affirmative action in employment were significant,
the expansiveness of the interest is too sweeping. Moreover, the
use of affirmative action in employment to achieve substantial
racial diversity may not even be needed, given the workforce
diversity that diversity in higher education already encourages.
Furthermore, the omnipresent dangers of divisiveness and market
distortion inherent in government-sponsored racial discrimination
generally outweigh its marginal benefits. Consequently, the Court
should cabin the scope of Grutter in equal protection to the higher
education context and disapprove its expansion to public employ-
ment.
A. Summary of the Case for Workforce Diversity
The benefits of greater workforce diversity that proponents of
affirmative action in employment cite are not facially insubstantial.
Some of these benefits may favorably impact society as a whole. As
discussed in Grutter, workforce diversity may increase the percep-
tion of the inclusiveness and legitimacy of diverse institutions.219
Just as many in society perceive diversity in elite educational
institutions as a particularly valuable signal of inclusion to people
outside of those institutions, society may favorably perceive
diversity in public workplaces that diverse taxpayers fund and with
which they interact. Individuals who do not directly benefit from
workplace affirmative action may know family, friends, and
neighbors who do. This perception of inclusiveness and legitimacy
may produce a greater sense that opportunities are open to all,
thereby encouraging others to seize new opportunities that they
may have previously thought were beyond their grasp. Then the
United States may more closely resemble "one Nation, indivisi-
ble.,220
Other benefits may also accrue within the parts of the workforce
that become more racially diverse. These benefits are not necessar-
219. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 332-33.
220. See id. at 332.
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ily unique to public employment; they are also part of the business
case for private workforce diversity.22' Workforce diversity may
increase tolerance for differences among individuals.222 This
tolerance then may lead to greater workforce cohesion that inspires
employees to produce a greater range of ideas that in turn inspire
a better overall quality of work.223 Work output from the diverse
ideas of a diverse workforce, in turn, may better accommodate an
increasingly diverse constituent or customer base in an increasingly
diverse society and global economy. 224 These benefits increase the
representativeness of both government and business.
B. Absence of Independent Countervailing Constitutional Interests
Supporting Workplace Diversity
Despite the arguable importance of the above benefits from a
policy perspective, they do not rise to the level of a constitutionally
rooted countervailing interest sufficient to outweigh the right of all
Americans to be free from racial discrimination by their own
government. The First Amendment does not seem to justify racial
discrimination to achieve workforce diversity, nor does any interest
in internal or national security. Any broad interest in increased
societal integration is not specifically constitutionally rooted so as
to justify racial discrimination.
1. Lack of First Amendment Connection to the General
Diversity Interest in Public Employment
Grutter concerned higher education and the purported zone of
heightened First Amendment protection of a conception of academic
freedom that included the selection of the student body in order to
produce a robust exchange of ideas. 2 5 Employment, by contrast,
221. See supra notes 160-65 and accompanying text.
222. See Katherine Y. Williams & Charles A. O'Reilly, III, Demography and Diversity in
Organizations: A Review of 40 Years of Research, 20 RES. IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR. 77,
112 (1998).
223. Id.
224. See Brief for Amici Curiae 65 Leading American Businesses in Support of
Respondents, supra note 162, at 7; Brief of General Motors as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Respondents, supra note 164, at 4, 12-13; Williams & O'Reilly, supra note 222, at 112.
225. See Grutter v. Bolinger, 539 U.S. 306, 328-30 (2003).
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generally does not implicate a First Amendment interest in
fostering the interchange of diverse ideas. Work offices, assembly
lines, lunch rooms, lounges, and other common workplace venues
are not as likely forums for academic discussion of societal condi-
tions as are classrooms. Casual conversations about societal
concerns indeed may occur in these workplace venues just as they
do in university dormitories, dining halls, and campus social
facilities. But in the university setting, these conversations
supplement the classroom learning in a usually residential forum
dedicated primarily to intellectual development. In the comparable
venues for conversation and interaction in the workplace, the
opportunity for such conversations is much more incidental and
necessarily less a part of the day of each employee, who has a fuller
life outside of the workplace than a student does outside of a
residential university.
Although the First Amendment roots of Grutter may have been
muted, they were the single element in the Court's reasoning that
moored the diversity rationale in the Constitution. Bakke, on which
Grutter at least partially relied, used a rationale almost completely
devoted to the First Amendment penumbras of academic freedom
as a compelling interest in the abstract.226 This rationale claimed
that racial diversity was one component of the lively interchange of
diverse ideas that was the core of academic freedom.22 v Grutter, as
indicated above, used that framing of the diversity rationale as the
doctrinal foundation, though not the limit, for its conception of the
diversity rationale.22 It specifically quoted from Bakke the notion
that institutions of higher learning occupy "special niche[s] in our
constitutional tradition."229 The dicta in Grutter about diversity as
a benefit to broader society thus can be understood as a supplemen-
tal policy rationale for recognizing the academic freedom exception
under strict scrutiny rather than an independent rationale for the
exception.
Without any mooring in the First Amendment, the racial
diversity rationale in employment is merely an interest in non-
academic operational effectiveness. A generalized affirmative action
226. See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
228. See supra notes 138-43 and accompanying text.
229. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329; see id. at 324.
20061 1133
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
of this type then amounts to discrimination against people because
of their race for the purpose of more effectively spending public
money. The Supreme Court rejected a similar purpose as insuffi-
cient to withstand even intermediate scrutiny of sex discrimination
under equal protection. Styling the rationale for discrimination in
Craig v. Boren as a formal sounding interest in "administrative ease
and convenience," the Supreme Court rejected this interest as not
even being "important," let alone compelling.23 °
Advocates of the expanded diversity rationale surely do not
minimize the importance of the interest by characterizing it as
merely related to more effectively spending money. Rather, they
cast the claimed increased operational effectiveness in terms of
breaking stereotypes within work groups and enhancing the
perception of civic inclusiveness among the broader public.23' But
aside from the speculative nature of these claimed benefits to
workforce diversity, changing the way people think about other
people and society does not seem to be a constitutional interest,
under the First Amendment or otherwise. The primary American
civil rights laws, the Equal Protection Clause and the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, address state action and employment discrimination,
respectively. They do not directly seek to change people's private
thoughts, stereotypical or otherwise.232
Advocates of the expanded diversity rationale also cast the
benefits of workforce diversity in terms of improved service directly
to the public.233 In a representative democracy, effective governmen-
tal service in addressing public "customers" may be more significant
than merely internally performing a bureaucratic function with
greater efficiency in a manner that conserves public money. But
this argument questionably assumes that a racially homogeneous
public workforce is unable to serve the public effectively, regardless
of the proficiency of nonminorities in community relations. If a
public workforce is sensitive to community differences in both
230. 429 U.S. 190, 198 (1976).
231. See Estlund, supra note 17, at 15-17, 23-31; Goldstein, supra note 140, at 946, 953;
Turner, supra note 17, at 217, 219.
232. Moreover, if the law required such private thought control, it arguably would violate
free speech as invalid content discrimination. See Jim Chen, Diversity and Damnation, 43
UCLA L. REv. 1839, 1887-900 (1996).
233. See Estlund, supra note 23, at 219; Turner, supra note 17, at 217.
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dealing with the public and internal problem solving, the only
apparent major advantage of a diverse public workforce in its
relation to the public does not exist unless the members of the
public themselves are uncomfortable or unwilling to conduct
business with someone of another race. Yet the Supreme Court has
expressly disavowed racial discrimination in order to satisfy other
people's private prejudices. 234 Even if members of the public were
more satisfied with their government when staffed by members of
their own race, therefore, such a nonconstitutional policy interest
is not only not compelling, but facially illegitimate.
As a general nonconstitutional interest, racial diversity is too
insubstantial to justify racial discrimination. Diversity in places of
employment does not implicate academic freedom or any other First
Amendment concern and therefore has no First Amendment or
other constitutional mooring. If probed to the degree that strict
scrutiny requires, the interest is facially illegitimate.
2. Inapplicability of Security Interests to Public Workforce
Diversity
Cases such as Korematsu, Wittmer, Reynolds, and Petit suggest
that internal security may be a compelling interest for racially
discriminatory affirmative action.235 This assertion may be correct
in the abstract. Regarding national security as a compelling
interest, Congress and the President have sweeping constitutional
"power to wage war successfully."23 Unlike a generalized diversity
interest, this power is deeply rooted in both the text and structure
of the Constitution.237 Additionally, the text and structure of the
234. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) (invalidating a lower court's
discriminatory award of custody of a white child to his father because his mother, also white,
had married a black man, and holding impermissible the lower court's consideration of
presumed likely prejudice the child would face growing up in an interracial family);
Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 81 (1917) (invalidating a racially discriminatory zoning
ordinance in spite of pleas that the ordinance was necessary to "promote the public peace by
preventing racial conflicts').
235. See supra Part IV.A-B.
236. See supra note 37.
237. U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 1-2 ("The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the
United States of America.... The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and
Navy of the United States .....); U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8 ('The Congress shall have Power To
... provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; ... To define and
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Constitution, along with the general overriding principle of self-
preservation inherent in self-government, provide some support
for internal security as a compelling interest. 8' Consequently,
the security interest provides the foundation for a substantially
narrower conception of the diversity rationale for affirmative action
than the general diversity interest in employment. This security
interest only would justify affirmative action plans in employment
contexts that implicate specific security concerns, such as the
military, corrections institutions, police forces, and perhaps fire-
fighting units.
Moreover, the internal security interest could justify affirmative
action only when actual events genuinely raise profound security
concerns. Otherwise, as the inappropriately loose application of
strict scrutiny in Korematsu indicates, a generalized security
interest would become a rationale for invidious racial discrimina-
tion without a sufficient factual basis or any real need.2"9 As the
Second Circuit rightly recognized in Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n
v. City of New York, and as the Seventh Circuit overlooked in
Wittmer, Reynolds, and Petit, marginal security concerns related to
the race of public employees are not automatically sufficient to
justify racial discrimination.24 A diverse security-related workforce
may be more adept at interacting with and serving a diverse
society, but a homogeneous security workforce is also presumably
capable of dealing adequately with such a diverse society, absent an
punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of
Nations; To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning
Captures on Land and Water; To raise and support Armies ...; To provide and maintain a
Navy; To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces....").
238. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 ("The Congress shall have power To ... provide for calling
forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel
Invasions; To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing
such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States...."); U.S. CONST.
art IV, § 4 ('CThe United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican
Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on Application
of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against
domestic Violence.").
239. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 236 (1995).
240. See supra Part IV.A-B; see also Patrolmen's Benevolent Ass'n v. City of New York,
310 F.3d 43, 50-54 (2d Cir. 2002). In Patrolman's Benevolent Ass'n, New York sought
unsuccessfully to transfer black police officers to an area of recent racial unrest, on
operational effectiveness grounds, but with no clear evidence that the transfers were
necessary for continued security. See id. at 47-48.
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emergency situation that requires the utmost urgency to commu-
nity relations. And the principle remains that mere discomfort with
interacting with members of other races, in service by law enforce-
ment or by public bureaucracy, does not rise to the level of a
"pressing public necessity"241 absent a genuine emergency. In fact,
as noted above, the Supreme Court has stated in other contexts that
mere private prejudice is an insufficient reason for abridging equal
protection.242
Aside from any purported benefit of eliminating prejudicial
discomfort, even if diversity in police forces and other security-
related workforces would substantially reduce the level of crime,
Supreme Court doctrine in criminal procedure nevertheless
strongly suggests that such a security-related gain does not justify
overriding equal protection. The Constitution provides various
procedural protections for individuals accused of crimes. These
protections include the Fourth Amendment right to have evidence
the police obtained through an unlawful search excluded from
trial 243 and the Fifth Amendment right to remain free from coercive
interrogations.244 In recognition of these principles, the Supreme
Court developed the exclusionary rule and the Miranda warnings
despite the likelihood that such doctrines would result in the
acquittal of, or failure to charge, people who have committed
crimes.2 45 These constitutional protections are deemed so funda-
mental as to be even more important than a marginal security
interest that alternative measures perhaps could, but in fact might
not, achieve. Because the right to be free from racial discrimination
is at least as fundamental to the American constitutional system as
the exclusionary rule and the Miranda doctrine, marginal and
speculative security gains are not sufficient to justify affirmative
action in public law enforcement.
A general security interest that is overwhelming may be more
compelling than a marginal security interest. If the absence of
diversity in the civil service, law enforcement, or the military would
cause either massive breakdowns within those entities or massive
241. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
242. See supra note 234 and accompanying text.
243. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 657 (1961).
244. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473-74 (1966).
245. See id. at 500 (Clark, J., dissenting); Mapp, 367 U.S. at 659.
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racial unrest in society, then affirmative action might be appropri-
ate. But Wittmer, Reynolds, and Petit did not claim that chaos
would result from homogeneous correctional institutions and police
forces.246
The Becton Brief, filed by retired (but not current) military
officers in Grutter, did claim that effective military cohesion
depended on a racially diverse officer corps.247 The brief cited
several incidents of racial violence that occurred within the military
during the Vietnam War before the officer corps became racially
heterogeneous.24 But this evidence is too weak to justify affirmative
action in the military. Racial unrest during the Vietnam War era
did exist, but it also was part of a broader countercultural rebel-
liousness of which race was one of many factors.249 No evidence
indicates that racial homogeneity in the officer corps generally
corresponded with a lack of cohesion in an otherwise heterogeneous
military. The Becton Brief cited no incidents of racial unrest in the
military at any time before the Vietnam War, during the early
stages of that war when societal unrest was less common, or during
any earlier American military conflict.25 ° This omission might not
be as material if the rank and file of the American military had not
been integrated before the period of racial unrest during the
Vietnam War that the brief cited. But the military rank and file had
been integrated since President Truman's 1948 executive order and
the Korean War.251 While racial diversity in the officer corps of the
military may promote a marginally greater level of internal
cohesion than the preexisting diversity in the rank and file, this
level is not demonstrably weighty enough to justify abridging equal
246. See supra Part IV.A-B.
247. Consolidated Brief of Lt. Gen. Julius Becton, et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondents at 5, 14, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-242).
248. Id. at 14-17. Although the armed forces were officially integrated in 1948, the officer
corps was not functionally integrated until later; in 1962, for instance, only 1.6% of
commissioned officers were black. Id. at 11, 14.
249. See ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH: MODERN LIBERALISM AND
AMERICAN DECLINE 17-33 (1996) (discussing the generalized grievances of the 1960s
counterculture, which extended to countries such as Sweden with no racial assimilation
problems comparable to those of the United States).
250. See Consolidated Brief of Lt. Gen. Julius Becton, et al., as Amici Curiae in Support
of Respondents, supra note 247, at 14-17.
251. MICHAEL R. GARDNER, HARRY TRUMAN AND CIVIL RIGHTS: MORAL COURAGE AND
POLITICAL RISKS 111-21 (2002).
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protection. Given the U.S. government's official opposition to the
program that the Becton Brief endorsed in Grutter,12 the status of
the Becton Brief as a document presented only by retired officers no
longer affiliated with the military reflects this logical attenuation.
Accordingly, while the security interest is constitutionally
compelling in the abstract, it is far too attenuated for the judiciary
to properly consider it as a genuinely compelling constitutional
interest in the employment context in all but the most urgent
circumstances.
C. Inherent Tendency of Affirmative Action in Public Employment
To Fail Narrow Tailoring Requirement of Strict Scrutiny
Even if employment diversity has some compelling constitution-
ally rooted value, affirmative action in employment is not a
constitutionally appropriate means to advance that interest. The
generally counterproductive results of affirmative action that courts
have always considered when evaluating such programs are present
in the employment context. Affirmative action in employment also
imposes significantly greater burdens on adversely affected
individuals than does affirmative action in higher education." 3
Additionally, affirmative action in higher education is likely to
produce significant diversity in the public workforce to a degree
that makes affirmative action in employment unnecessary to
achieve the benefits of significant workforce diversity.254
1. Severe General Burdens of Affirmative Action
The Supreme Court and observers of American law and culture
have long recognized that affirmative action has the dangerous
potential to ingrain race within the collective and individual
consciousness of the American people.255 Because the government
is the "omnipresent teacher," this race consciousness is particularly
252. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 10-12,
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241).
253. See infra notes 263-65 and accompanying text.
254. See infra notes 267-74 and accompanying text.
255. See, e.g., Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 637 (1990) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
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egregious when the government promotes it.2 56 Affirmative action
thereby tends to place a vicious stigma of inferiority on the
benefitted individuals that creates the impression that they require
the paternalism of others to succeed.257 It also spurs resentment
and animosity toward the beneficiaries of affirmative action by
those who stand to suffer from affirmative action.258 This resent-
ment may spread to other tolerant and unbigoted individuals who
do not directly suffer but who may suffer in the future or who know
family members, friends, and neighbors who suffer from affirmative
action. In a country that prides itself on being a meritocracy
without official ranks of nobility attached at birth, affirmative
action seems especially perverse.259 Racial conflict, self-segregation,
and perhaps racial violence remain ubiquitous specters with such
policies.26 ° Because these general injuries undermine some of the
asserted benefits of racial diversity, they are relevant in assessing
diversity-based affirmative action programs.
2. Exacerbated Injuries of Affirmative Action in Employment
Beyond the general injuries that affirmative action may inflict,
the specific injuries it inflicts on adversely affected individuals in
employment are also relevant in the narrow tailoring inquiry. The
256. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 531-32 & n.15 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
257. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 241 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488
U.S. 469, 516-17 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment);
SHELBY STEELE, THE CONTENT OF OUR CHARACTER: A NEW VISION OF RACE IN AMERICA 116-
19 (1990).
258. Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. at 636 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Croson, 488 U.S. at
493-94 (O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and White, J.); BORK, supra note 249, at 241-
42 (attributing increasing racial separatism on college campuses to afrmative action). See
JOHN MCWHORTER, LOSING THE RACE: SELF-SABOTAGE IN BLACK AMERICA 164-83 (2000).
259. See Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 532-33 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
260. See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 239 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment); Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 532-33 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting the connection
between resentment over titles of nobility fixed at birth and the beginning of the French
Revolution); ALLAN BLOOM, THE CLOSING OF THE AMERICAN MIND: HOW HIGHER EDUCATION
HAS FAILED DEMOCRACY AND IMPOVERISHED THE SOULS OF TODAY'S STUDENTS 91-96 (1987);
William Van Alstyne, Rites of Passage: Race, the Supreme Court, and the Constitution, 46 U.
CHI. L. REV. 775,804-10 (1979). See generally THOMAS SOWELL, AFFIRMATVEACTIONAROUND
THE WORLD: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY (2004) (discussing the effects of affirmative action in the
United States and several other countries).
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Supreme Court in Grutter clearly did not interpret the general
pitfalls of affirmative action discussed above as fatal to affirmative
action in higher education.261 But the Supreme Court long has
recognized that depriving an individual of a job because of his race
is a qualitatively more egregious burden under equal protection
than merely depriving him of a particular opportunity in higher
education.26 2 An individual who loses a desired opportunity for
higher education loses an opportunity for future advancement but
does not lose his ability to work and provide basic necessities of life
for himself and his family. An individual who does not attain
employment, on the other hand, loses a more immediate opportu-
nity to earn the money to provide for himself and his family.
Although an individual so deprived does not suffer the greater
burden of losing a job he already had, as in Wygant,263 his injury is
profound nonetheless. If such an individual is an entry-level or
recently unemployed job seeker, he must endure a renewed or
extended period of unemployment. If he is already employed and
seeking more desirable employment, he must continue working in
a less desirable work atmosphere. In any of these scenarios, the
aggregate exposure of individuals to the injuries of racial discrimi-
nation is greater than in the higher education and remedial
employment contexts. The effect is also more widespread: the
number of people applying for jobs at any given point is greater
than the number applying for admission to institutions of higher
learning.264 The stigma and resentment thus are likely to be greater
261. See supra Part III.A.
262. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 283 & n.l1, 284 (1986) (plurality
opinion).
263. Id.
264. In 2002, slightly over 2.5 million first-year students were enrolled in degree-granting
postsecondary institutions. NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., DIGEST
OF EDUCATION STATISTICS, 2004, tbl. 181, available at http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d04
tables/dt04_181.asp. In the same year, the number of people who were unemployed but
actively seeking employment was slightly less than 8.4 million. BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY 203 tbl. 1 (2006), available
at http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaatl.pdf. Both figures are imperfect indicators of the number
of people seeking employment and the number of people applying for admission to
universities. The postsecondary enrollment figure does not include people who applied to but
did not enroll in universities, while the unemployment figure does not include people who
are currently employed but are seeking other employment simultaneously. But because both
figures understate the numerical value they represent in this comparison, the comparison
itself remains presumably accurate in view of the large difference. The number of people,
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with affirmative action in employment than in higher education,
thereby rendering the operational benefits of employment diversity
even more marginal. Furthermore, the shift from the remedial to
the diversity rationale causes more of these harms in more parts of
the workforce than occurred before.265 This intermediate type of
injury, more severe than losing a chance at higher education but
less severe than termination from an existing job, is substantial
enough to warrant a strict assessment of the fit between the
particular means employed to achieve the end of workforce
diversity.
3. Ability To Achieve Work force Diversity Without Affirmative
Action
Additionally, affirmative action in employment logically is not
necessary to produce the marginal benefits of diversity in employ-
ment. This paradoxical truth arises because universities now very
aggressively use affirmative action.266 Diversity in higher education
trains students in diverse settings and produces diversity in the
ever-growing college educated labor market, which in turn produces
employees trained in diversity and employees of diverse back-
grounds. Affirmative action in higher education thus is a less
restrictive means of achieving the benefits of diversity in employ-
ment. One requirement of a narrowly tailored policy under equal
protection is that the asserted compelling interest must not be
therefore, who are seeking employment is approximately three times the number of people
seeking a post-secondary education.
265. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
266. Before Grutter, one United States Court of Appeals had invalidated most affirmative
action in higher education. See Hopwood v. State of Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 941-48 (5th Cir.
1996). The increasing stringence of Supreme Court doctrine in this area signified by Croson
and Adarand likely made uncertain the viability of affirmative action in higher education in
other circuits. Grutter removed this uncertainty in those circuits and reversed course in the
Fifth Circuit, in which schools promptly reinitiated affirmative action. See, e.g., Robert D.
Meckel, UT-Austin Changes Policy on Use of Race and Ethnicity in Admissions, 15 HISPANIC
OUTLOOK ON HIGHER EDUC. 25 (2004) (describing the University of Texas's reintroduction
of preferential affirmative action after Grutter). Moreover, the large number of colleges that
supported the policy in Grutter indicates the willingness of most schools to use the Grutter
decision to aggressivley use affirmative action. See, e.g., Brief for Harvard University, et al.
as Amici Curae Supporting Respondents, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-
241).
1142 [Vol. 48:1091
THE DIVERSITY RATIONALE
attainable by readily available means that do not harm others.26 7
Because relying on diversity in education can now produce the
benefits of diversity in employment without any discrimination in
employment, discriminatory affirmative action in employment is
not narrowly tailored.
In Grutter, both the Supreme Court and advocates of the
diversity rationale in higher education acknowledged the unique
role of education in providing the wide range of benefits they
associated with diversity. Justice O'Connor's opinion for the Court
specifically cited the opportunities that minorities would gain to
become leaders in the government and business only as a benefit of
diversity in competitive educational institutions.268 Similarly,
General Motors, in its amicus brief supporting affirmative action in
higher education, described universities as "ideal" settings to
realize the benefits of diversity.2 s Training in diverse settings
would inculcate tolerance of others and break stereotypes, without
the benefit of diversity in employment to teach the same
messages.270 The General Motors brief also stated, "[h]igher
education, by making up for educational inequities at early stages
in life, can be the ramp up to a level playing field-with no further
affirmative action-for the rest of one's future.2 7 ' Moreover, the
General Motors brief tried to support its position by asserting that
affirmative action in higher education based on diversity would not
lead to expanded affirmative action in employment:
Contrary to [the plaintiffs] argument, the point that an educa-
tion in a diverse setting results in "benefits accruing to students
after they have graduated from college" does not "demonstrate
that there is no principle that confines the interest to the
education context" and thereby enable[s] diversity to "become a
justification for using race to treat people differently in many
walks of life. ' 72
267. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 341.
268. Id. at 330-32.
269. Brief of General Motors Corp. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, supra
note 164, at 18-23 (citation omitted).
270. Id.
271. Id. at 23 (emphasis added) (quoting Akhil Reed Amar & Neal Kumar Katyal, Bakke's
Fate, 43 UCLA L. REv. 1745, 1749 (1996)).
272. Id. at 18 n.10 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
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Accordingly, the Supreme Court should not recognize an ex-
panded diversity rationale for affirmative action in public employ-
ment. The purported general employment benefits of diversity are
not rooted in any independently fundamental countervailing
constitutional principle such as the First Amendment. The pur-
ported security benefits from such specific forms of affirmative
action in corrections institutions, law enforcement units, and the
military are too amorphous. Further, affirmative action policies in
public employment suffer from several intrinsic narrow tailoring
problems. Both the general and the specific injuries that affirmative
action in the public employment context inflicts negate the benefits
of workforce diversity. The benefits of diversity from affirmative
action in higher education are also sufficient to achieve diversity in
employment without inflicting the counterproductive injuries of
racial discrimination through affirmative action in employment.7 3
Containment of the diversity rationale for affirmative action to the
higher education context is thus the proper constitutional course.
VI. ILLEGALITY OF A DIVERSITY RATIONALE IN PRIVATE SECTOR
EMPLOYMENT UNDER TITLE VII
General Motors's arguments in Grutter notwithstanding, General
Motors and other businesses do use affirmative action programs to
increase the racial diversity of their workforces .1 4 Though the
courts have not yet announced any exception to Title VII beyond a
remedial interest, 275 private businesses have been able to use
affirmative action thus far without legal constraints under Title VII
in most jurisdictions. The potentially expansive diversity rationale
in Grutter and its relevance to private businesses' practices portend
273. This proposition is empirically difficult to evaluate because employers have utilized
affirmative action at the same times as have universities. A quantitative comparison of the
levels of diversity in employment with and without affirmative action in employment, holding
diversity in universities constant, is not realistic in view of the concurrent use of affirmative
action in both employment and education. See supra Part III.B. The conclusion in the text
nevertheless is supported by the logical relationship between the college educated labor
market and the actual workforce.
274. See supra Part III.B.
275. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 197 (1979).
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a possible shift in Title VII doctrine." 6 Many of the arguments for
the diversity rationale in private employment are similar to
arguments for the diversity rationale for public employment.7 7
Likewise, private business affirmative action programs geared
toward diversity are contrary to Title VII for most of the same
reasons that public employer affirmative action geared toward
diversity are contrary to the Equal Protection Clause. 278 Neverthe-
less, Title VII analysis, while similar, is not identical to equal
protection analysis. 279 Title VII's more categorical wording, its clear
legislative history, and the even more marginal nature of the
interest in racial diversity in business make the case for contain-
ment of exceptions in Title VII doctrine even clearer than it is under
equal protection doctrine.
A. Categorical Wording of Title VII's Text
Title VII's principal text unequivocally states that private
employers involved in interstate commerce may not discriminate
against anyone because of race, nor because of sex, religion, and
national origin.280 In this regard, it is much more specific than the
Equal Protection Clause, which does not explicitly reference racial
classifications and does not define the perhaps vague concept of
"equal protection. ''281 The actual meaning of the Equal Protection
Clause derives from its history following the Civil War 212 and
judicial analogies of nonracial characteristics to race.283 A few sound
judicially crafted exceptions to the equal protection rule for race and
more for protected nonrace characteristics thus are not per se
276. See Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 646-47 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(suggesting that diversity justifications for workplace affirmative action jurisprudence under
Title VII may be appropriate); id. at 650-51 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment)
(suggesting that Title VII analysis of racial discrimination is not doctrinally different from
equal protection evaluation of racial discrimination).
277. See supra Part VA.
278. See supra Part V.B-C.
279. See supra Part II.
280. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000).
281. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
282. See PAUL JOHNSON, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 505-07 (1997).
283. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684-99 (1973) (plurality opinion)
(determining the proper level of equal protection scrutiny for public sex discrimination by
analogizing sex to race).
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inconsistent with the text of the Equal Protection Clause. Title VII
exceptions in the statutory text, however, are nonexistent for racial
classifications and textually explicit for nonracial but otherwise
protected classifications. Title VII contains an exception for "bona
fide occupational qualifications" that allows some discrimination
based on sex, religion, and national origin, but it contains no such
exception for race.2"
This textual analysis indicates that the judiciary should disfavor
any unwritten Title VII exceptions. In construing another statute,
Justice Thurgood Marshall, one of the staunchest judicial support-
ers of affirmative action,28 5 expressed well for a unanimous Court
the need to plainly construe categorical statutes:
When construing a statute so explicit in scope, a court must act
within certain well-defined constraints. If a legislative purpose
is expressed in "plain and unambiguous language,... the... duty
of the courts is to give it effect according to its terms." Excep-
tions to clearly delineated statutes will be implied only where
essential to prevent "absurd results" or consequences obviously
at variance with the policy of the enactment as a whole.2
The fact that the Supreme Court did not adhere to a literal
interpretation of Title VII in Weber and Johnson indicates that such
an interpretation alone is not sufficient to decide the validity of a
possible Title VII diversity exception.287 But literal textual construc-
tion of Title VII should also at least inform courts' construction of
Title VII.
284. This textual exception states that employers may discriminate on the basis of
religion, sex, or national origin "in those certain instances where religion, sex, or national
origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation
of that particular business enterprise." Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(e) (2000); Turner, supra note 17, at 234.
285. See supra note 64.
286. United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 551-52 (1979) (internal citation omitted)
(construing a statute other than Title VIl).
287. See supra Part II.A.
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B. Congressional Intent for a Broad Antidiscrimination Principle
in Title VII
Because of the Court's divergence in Weber and Johnson from the
natural textual interpretation of Title VII, a fuller understanding
of Congress's statutory intent is more likely decisive of the validity
of a possible diversity exception than statutory text alone. The
legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which enacted
Title VII, is relevant to this inquiry. The competing explications of
congressional intent that Justices Brennan and Rehnquist ad-
vanced in Weber are thus important beyond the remedial exception
that emerged from that case. For many of the same reasons that the
Third Circuit articulated in Taxman,2" congressional intent does
not support a diversity exception to Title VII.
As indicated above, the plain meaning of Title VII's text reflects
a congressional intent for a broad nondiscrimination principle that
protects members of all races.2"9 The Supreme Court first recog-
nized this principle in McDonald when it held that Congress
intended Title VII to protect whites on the same terms by which it
protects blacks and other racial minorities.29 0 The competing
perspectives in Weber, however, reflect the uncertainty surrounding
Congress's intent regarding certain narrow kinds of remedial
affirmative action programs. As Justice Rehnquist articulated with
remarkable thoroughness, Congress specifically foresaw reverse
discrimination against whites and sought to forbid such discrimina-
tion.291 At the same time, as Justice Brennan's majority opinion
articulated, Congress more specifically intended to elevate the
economic status of blacks who had suffered previous discrimina-
tion.292
This recognition, which validated a remedial exception to Title
VII, should not entirely negate the value of Justice Rehnquist's
explication of the legislative history in evaluating other possible
288. See supra Part II.B.2.
289. See supra notes 60-66 and accompanying text; Part VI.A.
290. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 278-80 (1976).
291. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 226-53 (1979) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting) (quoting extensive portions of the Senate and House floor debates on the Civil
Rights Act of 1964).
292. Id. at 201-08 (majority opinion).
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exceptions. Although Justice Rehnquist's opinion was a dissenting
opinion joined only by Chief Justice Burger, the majority did not
expressly repudiate its essential description of Title VII's purpose
apart from the remedial rationale.293 In fact, one of the members of
the Weber majority and a staunch supporter of affirmative action,
Justice Blackmun,29 4 stated in a concurring opinion in Weber, "I
share some of the misgivings expressed in Mr. Justice Rehnquist's
dissent concerning the extent to which the legislative history of
Title VII clearly supports the result the Court reaches today. 295
Further, one of the members of the majority in Weber, Justice
White, later repudiated his support of Justice Brennan's opinion,
embraced Justice Rehnquist's view, and voted to overrule Weber.296
Additionally, Justice Stevens, who voted in Johnson to retain
Weber, stated his view that as an original matter he agreed with
Justice Rehnquist's Weber dissent, but he did not vote to overrule
that case on stare decisis grounds.297 Justice Stevens also authored
an earlier opinion in Bakke, in which he was joined by three other
Justices, that interpreted Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
governing the standard for educational institutions that receive
federal funds, in a way that mirrored Justice Rehnquist's later
general antidiscriminatory construction of Title VII in Weber.298
These positions of other Justices indicate that Justice Rehnquist's
dissent in Weber may have been more persuasive to others on the
court than the small number of Justices who joined that opinion
would suggest.
The present members of the Supreme Court are likely more
sympathetic to the Rehnquist perspective on Title VII and affirma-
tive action than the Court has been in recent history. Although
Chief Justice Burger, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justice White
are no longer on the Court, Justice Scalia, who joined the Court
after Weber and signed onto the Rehnquist Weber position in voting
293. See id.
294. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 561 (1989) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 402-03 (1978) (Blackmun,
J., concurring).
295. Weber, 443 U.S. at 209 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
296. Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 657 (1987) (White, J., dissenting).
297. See id. at 642-44 (Stevens, J., concurring).
298. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 413-18 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
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to overturn it in Johnson remains.299 Several new members have
since joined the Court without expressing an opinion on the proper
scope of Weber. Based on their opinions thus far, Justices Kennedy
and Thomas likely are sympathetic to the Rehnquist position on
Weber.300 Chief Justice Roberts and especially Justice Alito are also
likely to be sympathetic to this perspective,"0 ' though they have not
authored or joined any opinions on affirmative action as Supreme
Court Justices. These four Justices may form a natural coalition
with Justice Scalia that is more sympathetic to a narrow reading of
any Title VII exceptions for affirmative action. The Rehnquist
dissent in Weber thus merits serious consideration in construing the
scope of proposed additional exceptions to Title VII, apart from
those in the remedial context in which a majority of the Court has
halfheartedly rejected it.
Accordingly, the Rehnquist position should at least be reconciled
with the Brennan position in evaluating possible additional
exceptions to Title VII. A more complete understanding of the
legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 supports the view
that Congress's intent was to enact a general nondiscrimination
principle with only narrow exceptions. Any exceptions therefore
should reflect the basic intent of the legislation. °2 Supporters of a
diversity exception have argued that Congress's intent should be
299. Johnson, 480 U.S. at 657-58 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
300. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 388 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
(concluding that the University of Michigan Law School's affirmative action policy was not
narrowly tailored); Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 633 (1990) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that "broadcast diversity" is not a compelling interest for the federal
government); see also Grutter, 539 U.S. at 350 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (arguing that all public forms of affirmative action in higher education are
unconstitutional); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 240 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (asserting the moral equivalency of
discrimination against minorities and discrimination against nonminorities in the form of
affirmative action policies).
301. See Taxman v. Bd. of Educ., 91 F.3d 1547, 1557-58 (3d Cir. 1996) (invoking a strict
application of the Weber test, with Judge Alito joining the majority opinion). Although Chief
Justice Roberts has not decided any cases on affirmative action as an appellate judge, as
Justice Alito has, his close personal and general philosophical identification with Chief
Justice Rehnquist may provide a clue of Chief Justice Roberts's probable understanding of
affirmative action and Title VII. See Charles Lane, Short Record as Judge Is Under a
Microscope, WASH. POST, July 21, 2005, at Al ("[Chief Justice Roberts's] sparse judicial
record resembles the conservatism of a man he once worked for at the Supreme Court, Chief
Justice William H. Rehnquist.').
302. See Taxman, 91 F.3d at 1557.
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read more broadly to include the purpose of expanding employment
opportunities for all traditionally excluded individuals, regardless
of any specific acts of past discrimination. °3 Such an argument
views diversity as an end sufficient in itself to justify discrimination
rather than a means to achieve other benefits. Further, this
proposal would amount to recognizing an exception for past societal
discrimination, which the Supreme Court has uniformly rejected in
the equal protection areas as a principle that would swallow the
general nondiscrimination principle.0 4 Such a result would violate
the principle of congressional intent that any exception to Title VII
must be narrow and not undermine the general nondiscriminatory
impact of Title VII for individuals of all races.0 5
Other advocates of a diversity exception to Title VII attempt to
shoehorn the generic benefits of socialization into the congressional
intent behind the Civil Rights Act of 1964. According to this
perspective, Congress intended not only to eliminate present acts
of discrimination, primarily against minorities, but also to elimi-
nate the causes of future discrimination against those minorities.0 6
Diversity purportedly neutralizes this future discrimination by
breaking stereotypes of minority inferiority and white supremacy
and by increasing the ability of whites to work with minorities in all
aspects of an integrated society.30 7 The Third Circuit in Taxman
properly rejected this argument as a "dramatic rewriting of the
goals underlying Title VII. '' 8 But this brief rebuttal was only one
footnote in the opinion of the Taxman majority.0 9 In light of the
Grutter Court's favorable view of the generic social benefits of
diversity,310 the issue may call for a more thorough treatment than
a single sentence in a single footnote.
The latter argument for a diversity exception has several
significant flaws. First, this argument is highly speculative. It
assumes that future discrimination against minorities is inevitable,
despite the fact that the very legislation to which they seek an
303. Id. at 1577 (Lewis, J., dissenting).
304. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
305. Taxman, 91 F.3d at 1557.
306. Id. at 1571 (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting).
307. Id. at 1571-72.
308. Id. at 1558 n.9.
309. Id.
310. See supra notes 141-44 and accompanying text.
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exception makes most of that discrimination illegal. 1' It similarly
assumes that allowing discrimination against nonminorities will be
effective in reducing the willingness of nonminorities to counte-
nance future discrimination against minorities. As stated above, the
animosity engendered by such reverse discrimination is at least as
likely, if not more likely, to engender hostility that may lead to
more discrimination against minorities than such discrimination
might prevent among people attuned to the values of diversity. 12
More fundamentally, however, the argument of preventing future
discrimination relies on an overly generalized version of actual
congressional intent that fundamentally alters the justification for
the narrow remedial exception. The advocates of a diversity
exception to Title VII do plausibly state that the Weber remedial
rationale does not purport to exhaust the range of all possible
exceptions.313 Congress could have conceivably intended both a
narrow range of exceptions to Title VII and some other narrow
nonremedial exception. But this intent is not plausible in view of
the huge gap in the nondiscrimination guarantee that such a
diversity exception would produce. Because the absence of future
discrimination can never be assured in any part of society, this and
other conceptions of the diversity rationale would allow reverse
discrimination in every part of society. Because employment
discrimination can affect more people in a greater portion of their
lives than discrimination in education, a diversity exception for
employment under Title VII would be an egregious rewriting of
Title VII's purpose."4 The congressional intent behind Title VII, as
stated in a hybridized Brennan-Rehnquist interpretation,. 5 thus
cannot permit this exception.
The specific textual wording of the bona fide occupational
qualification exception provision of Title VII" 6 buttresses this
understanding that the diversity exception cannot exist among
whatever limited Title VII exceptions are consistent with congres-
sional intent. As noted above, Title VII generally prohibits discrimi-
311. See Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000); supra note 4.
312. See supra Part V.B.1-2.
313. See Taxman, 91 F.3d at 1570 (Sloviter, C.J., dissenting).
314. See supra notes 265, 303-05 and accompanying text.
315. See supra notes 291-92 and accompanying text.
316. See supra note 284 and accompanying text.
2006] 1151
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
nation in employment against people because of their sex, religion,
and national origin, as well as race and ethnicity.317 But it only
contains a textual exception for sex, religion, and national origin
when such characteristics are elements of a bona fide occupational
qualification. 18 The wording of this provision strongly suggests that
Congress did not intend for an exception to Title VII based on
instrumental advantages of racial discrimination. It did foresee the
need for such an exception for sex, religion, and national origin,
which under some circumstances could be relevant to an employer's
or society's interests.3 9 If Congress wanted a similar exception for
race, it simply could have added race to the list of bona fide
occupational qualifications, as it did with the other protected
characteristics.
C. Inadequacy of Equitable Considerations To Justify a Diversity
Exception to Title VII
In spite of the clarity of the case for containing Title VII excep-
tions to the remedial rationale, some advocates of expanded
affirmative action contend that the purported policy advantages of
diverse workplaces outweigh this statutory meaning.320 This
position then amounts to a claim that the judiciary should legislate
from the bench to enact a law that Congress did not pass. But
because the Supreme Court might be vulnerable to claims that its
Title VII jurisprudence should somewhat more closely resemble its
equal protection jurisprudence, 2' and because many of its members
think so highly of the instrumental benefits of diversity,322 the
pitfalls of this equitable construction argument deserve more
specific evaluation.
317. See supra note 280 and accompanying text.
318. See supra note 284.
319. Even for these nonracial classifications, the Court has held that this exception "was
in fact meant to be an extremely narrow exception to the general prohibition of
discrimination." Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977); see, e.g., id. at 336-37
(upholding a discriminatory hiring policy in a state prison only upon a showing that the
conditions of the prison would have subjected women to an unacceptably high danger of
assault by male sex offenders).
320. See Estlund, supra note 17, at 36-38; Turner, supra note 17, at 235-36.
321. See Estlund, supra note 23, at 215-16.
322. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 329-33 (2003).
1152 [Vol. 48:1091
THE DIVERSITY RATIONALE
Arguments for and against a Title VII exception under this mode
of reasoning bear much similarity to arguments for a further
diversity exception for public employment under equal protection.
Private sector workforce diversity may increase personal tolerance
among employees, enhance their ability to work together in an
integrated society and global economy, and improve their ability
to develop and market their products to the diverse public effec-
tively.323 As stated in Part VI.B and Part VI.C of this Note,
discriminatory affirmative action in employment may serve
interests that are marginal in fact, cater only to people's private
prejudices, inflict needless injury that inspires unfortunate levels
of animosity, and advance generic social objectives that less
restrictive means may achieve. Nevertheless, affirmative action in
employment in the private sector advances the claimed benefits to
a degree that is more marginal than in the public employment
context. It also threatens to inflict harms greater than affirmative
action in public employment. 24
1. Relatively Insubstantial Nature of Benefits of Diversity in
Private Business
Even if public workforce diversity advanced important interests,
diversity in private sector employment does not have a plausible
connection to increased societal legitimacy or perceptions of greater
inclusiveness. Private sector employees are usually not as visible to
the public as are public sector employees in broad representative
capacities. Public sector employees represent the people at large.
Public employees with direct contact with the public may affect the
views that those members of the public have of their government.
They may feel that a diverse public workforce truly speaks for them
and causes the government to warrant their trust, while a public
workforce that is not diverse may cause them to feel alienated from
their government. Private workforces, whether racially diverse or
not, likely do not have this similar exalted role in the public's
conception of society. They represent usually for-profit employers
who seek to make money by serving some of the populace's
323. Id. at 219.
324. See infra Part VI.C.2.
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narrower private demands; they do not serve the people's collective
concerns and aspirations. Marginal increases in operational
effectiveness in private business may enhance their sensitivity to
their own particular segment of the consumer population. Such
enhancements may increase their private profitability. But private
profit is not as important a policy as the public welfare. 25 Though
this profitability may spur stronger economic growth that benefits
the macroeconomy and the public at large,"' this benefit is indirect
and incidental. Fundamental civil rights are not appropriate
tradeoffs for purely financial profit.327
2. Relatively More Severe Nature of Some Injuries from Private
Sector Affirmative Action
The argument that racial diversity will improve business's
bottom line,328 besides being insubstantial to justify affirmative
action, overlooks the somewhat more severe additional injuries that
affirmative action inflicts in private sector employment than in
public sector employment. These injuries concern both the busi-
nesses themselves and the broader society.
Private sector employers are necessarily competitive enterprises.
Unlike public sector employers who will exist as long as the
legislature approves of their existence, private businesses are
more fragile.329 Consequently, any negative impact on their ability
to function may harm them more than a comparable negative
impact on public employers. If greater diversity actually increased
325. See U.S. CONST. pmbl. ("We the People of the United States, in Order to ... promote
the general Welfare ... do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of
America.').
326. See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 352 (C.J. Bullock ed., P.F. Collier & Son 1909) (1776) ("By pursuing his own interest
[a merchant] frequently promotes that of the society more effectively than when he really
intends to promote it.").
327. Cf. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198 (1976) (recognizing that administrative
efficiency and convenience in public law enforcement do not justify sex discrimination).
328. See WOOD, supra note 2, at 214.
329. In 1997 and 1998, the numbers of businesses that failed were 84,342 and 71,857,
respectively. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2000 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: THE
NATIONALDATA BOOK 548 tbl. 876, available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2001pubs/statab/
sec17.pdf. Government agencies, on the other hand, are less likely to have similar threats
to their existence, with a near-constant flow of taxpayer revenue.
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profitability, affirmative action might indeed be more important to
businesses. But some evidence indicates that affirmative action
severely costs private sector employers. Because the drive for
diversity causes employers to hire minorities whose objective
qualifications would otherwise not merit hiring, businesses lose the
productive energies of some of the best qualified applicants for
available employment positions.33 They must also expend the
money necessary to administer their affirmative action programs.
Businesses that contract with governmental entities, which impose
affirmative action requirements on them, must pay added adminis-
trative costs of conforming their particular affirmative action
programs to governmental specifications.33' Approximately forty-
two percent of the private American workforce falls within the
scope of these federal requirements.332
A study by two economists placed dollar figures on these
resulting losses.333 Their study estimates that affirmative action
caused businesses to lose $225 billion annually in direct, indirect,
and opportunity costs.334 This figure was equivalent to a loss of four
percent of the Gross National Product of the United States. 5 While
some of these costs are likely borne in analogous expenses of public
employers, the destructive impact likely is greater on competitive
business enterprises for which the price of lost opportunities is
qualitatively more severe.
At least for businesses that voluntarily adopt affirmative action
programs, advocates of a diversity exception to Title VII argue that
330. BORK, supra note 249, at 238.
331. WOOD, supra note 2, at 214; Peter Brimelow & Leslie Spencer, When Quotas Replace
Merit, Everybody Suffers, FORBES, Feb. 15, 1993, at 82-94 (discussing compliance costs of
affirmative action).
332. Brimelow & Spencer, supra note 331, at 90.
333. Id. Though the Brimelow and Spencer study was from the early 1990s, its underlying
calculations retain validity in the early twenty-first century, given the continuation of the
same underlying dynamics of affirmative action policies and legal assessments of their
validity.
334. Id. at 99.
335. Id. at 82. Another analyst more recently referenced the Brimelow and Spencer study
and added an estimate that affirmative action in public contracting with private businesses
cost the taxpayers approximately $2 billion in 2004, based on the higher bids submitted by
minority subcontracting firms that primary contractors are induced to accept. Edwin S.
Rubenstein, Affirmative Action and the Costs of "Diversity," NAT'L POLICY INST., Sept. 12,
2005, at 9-10, available at http://www. nationalpolicyinstitute.org/pdf/analysis-100. pdf.
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the operational benefits to diversity in fact motivate businesses to
craft their affirmative action policies and that the profit motive
encourages them to constrain those programs to not be counterpro-
ductive to their bottom line.3"6 But this argument overlooks the
nonmarket societal factors that often motivate businesses to pursue
affirmative action. Many businesses have adopted affirmative
action not at their own initiation but under political pressure to
adopt fashionable policies in favor of diversity. 37 Many also may
adopt such policies under threat of boycotts or lawsuits, based on
unsubstantiated accusations of discrimination against minorities,
unless those businesses promote greater diversity.338 Consequently,
many businesses perhaps would suffer financially from an absence
of diversity and affirmative action. But that injury would not result
from the inability to realize any substantial benefits of operational
effectiveness that flow from diversity. It would instead result from
external societal factors.
In addition to the economic price for businesses, individuals and
society experience greater injuries from private sector affirmative
action than they do from similar policies in the public sector. A
judicially recognized diversity exception to Title VII would exacer-
bate these injuries. Like their public sector counterparts, applicants
for private sector positions who are unsuccessful because of
affirmative action have suffered a severe injury that may under-
mine their livelihood. 339 But in the American capitalist economy, the
private sector employs more people than the public sector.34 °
Presumably, therefore, more people lose jobs because of affirmative
action in the private sector than in the public sector. This greater
degree of direct personal injury is thus more lamentable, and
the danger for racial stigma, animosity, and polarization is
336. Estlund, supra note 23, at 219, 222.
337. See WOOD, supra note 2, at 214-15.
338. See TIMMERMAN, supra note 158, at 127-30, 132-34, 273-78, 280-84.
339. See supra Part V.C.2.
340. In 2003, 146.5 million individuals were employed. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 2006
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: THE NATIONAL DATA BOOK 387 tbl. 576,
available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2005pubs/06statab/labor.pdf. All federal, state, and
local governmental entities employed 21.3 million civilians. Id. at 307 tbl. 451, available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/2005pubs/06statab/stlocgov.pdf. Accordingly, approximately
125.2 million people were employed in the private sector in 2003. This figure is almost six
times the number of people employed in the public sector.
1156 (Vol. 48:1091
THE DIVERSITY RATIONALE
augmented. 4' Unlike public sector affirmative action, private sector
discrimination indeed might not have the direct impact of alienat-
ing adversely affected individuals-and their families, friends, and
neighbors-from their government. This contrast would lessen the
relative injury of private sector employment discrimination. But
private sector discrimination that occurs because the government
makes a diversity exception to a fundamental civil rights principle
is the government's responsibility almost as much as with public
sector affirmative action. A societal awareness of this condition
could well make the resentment that private sector affirmative
action engenders similar in kind to and greater in degree than the
resentment that public sector affirmative action engenders.
Accordingly, when combined with the insubstantiality of genuine
business benefits to diversity,342 the infliction of human injury
should render a diversity exception to Title VII, with its clear
textual and Congressional purpose, an inappropriate doctrine.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Grutter v. Bollinger suggested
that the government had affixed its seal of approval on the
widespread use of affirmative action in employment. It created a
potentially expansive diversity rationale for affirmative action that
reaches beyond higher education and extends to employment in
both the public and private sectors. Other courts anticipated this
doctrinal shift before Grutter and also cautiously expanded it after
Grutter.343 The Supreme Court will be forced to contend with these
severe implications at some time in the future.
Though an expanded diversity rationale is a plausible result of
the reasoning in Grutter, it is not a necessary outcome. Grutter
concerned a factual context with arguable countervailing constitu-
tional considerations that the employment contexts do not
present.3" The Supreme Court will therefore confront a clear choice:
will it preserve the guarantee of protection from racial discrimina-
tion, or will it instead adopt the more expansive components of its
341. See supra note 341; supra Part V.C.2.
342. See supra Part VI.C.1.
343. See supra Parts III.B-IV.2.
344. Supra Part III.B.
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earlier diversity rationale in new areas? The latter, more permis-
sive course appears consistent with the Grutter Court's policy views
about the benefits of racial diversity, but the course of containment
is more in line with the Court's longer established policy of
confining the permissible bounds of exceptions to equal protection
and Title VII. Furthermore, affirmative action in employment offers
only marginal operational benefits to employers, needlessly injures
innocent individuals, and promotes insidious group polarization.
Accordingly, if it retains Grutter, the Supreme Court should confine
Grutter to the context of higher education. The Court should declare
affirmative action in public sector employment to be unconstitu-
tional under equal protection, and it should declare affirmative
action in private sector employment to be illegal under Title VII.
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